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Abstract 
The energy market in Australia and particularly the state of Victoria, finds itself in a precarious, 
transitional state. Researchers have concluded that barriers to orderly exit are present for highly-polluting 
and aged incumbent brown coal generation, further preventing renewable generation from entering the 
market (Riesz & Noone, 2013; AEMC, 2015a; Frontier Economics, 2015). Faced with oversupply of 
generating capacity and the unwillingness of the government to adopt a first-best carbon price, a variety 
of second-best measures have emerged attempting to achieve an emissions-efficient retirement and help 
Australia reach its ratified emission targets (Caldecott et al., 2015; Jotzo & Mazouz, 2015; Nelson et al., 
2015). This paper aims to investigate the usefulness of a cooperative bargaining mechanism under the 
threat of an emissions performance standard (EPS), for two of the most emission intensive generators in 
the National Electricity Market. We estimate the expected income for the generators over their expected 
lives under differing EPS stringencies from a base case scenario. Utilising Nash Bargaining, it is 
determined whether an agreement can be reached for one to pay the other to retire. The power plants 
choose between lowering output (‘mothballing’ capacity), or installing carbon capture and storage 
facilities (CCS) in order to comply with the regulation. We finally introduce expectations of regulatory 
uncertainty to examine the effect on previous outcomes. 
The findings indicate that implementing a modest but credible threat of a 1.1t CO2-e/MWh could 
theoretically achieve a plant exit. High decommissioning and rehabilitation costs prevent weaker and 
more politically acceptable emission standards succeeding. The owners select mothballing of capacity 
over the high investment costs and inefficiencies associated with CCS to adhere to the regulation when 
bargaining fails. When introducing regulatory uncertainty with the outcome, the agreement is expected to 
fail if plant owners expect the policy to be ineffective on profits for more than 51% of the time. 
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Sammanfattning 
Energimarknaden i Australien och särskilt i staten Victoria befinner sig i en osäker övergångsperiod. 
Forskare har konstaterat att barriärer existerar som gör det svårt för högförorenade och åldrande brunkol 
att upphöra brukas, vilket motverkar den nya generationens förnybara energikällor från att inta marknaden 
(Riesz & Noone, 2013; AEMC, 2015a; Frontier Economics, 2015). Ett överutbud av produktionskapacitet 
tillsammans med regeringens ovilja att sätta ett pris på koldioxidutsläpp, medför att reglerande ingrepp är 
behövda för att uppnå en utsläppseffektiv stängning av den äldre generationen, vilket skulle hjälpa 
Australien att uppnå sitt utsläppsmål från klimatmötet i Paris 2015 (Caldecott et al., 2015; Jotzo & 
Mazouz, 2015; Nelson et al., 2015). Denna forskning strävar mot att förse en fallstudie för att undersöka 
användbarheten av kooperativa förhandlingar under hotet av EPS (Emissions Performance Standard) på 
två av de mest förorenade i den Australienska energimarknaden. Vi uppskattar den förväntade inkomsten 
för kolkraftverken under deras livslängd under olika stringenser av EPS och ett basfallscenario. Därefter 
utnyttjar vi Nash Bargaining för att avgöra huruvida en överenskommelse där ett kolkraftverk betalar ett 
annat för att lämna marknaden kan uppnås. Kolkraftverken väljer mellan att sänka produktionen 
(’mothballing’), eller att installera koldioxidfångning och lagring (CCS) för att följa regleringen. Slutligen 
undersöker vi detta med ett tillsatt inslag av osäkerhet i regeringens politik för att undersöka effekten av 
tidigare resultat.  
Resultaten indikerar att implementation av ett måttligt men trovärdigt hot av 1,1 ton CO2-e/MWh kan 
teoretiskt sett medföra att ett kolkraftverk försvinner från marknaden. Höga kostnader för avveckling och 
restaurering förhindrar svagare och mer politiskt acceptabla utsläppsstandarder från att lyckas. Ägare av 
kolkraftverk väljer till övervägande del ’mothballing’ av kapaciteten över de höga 
investeringskostnaderna associerade med CCS för att hålla sig fast vid regleringen då ett icke-avtal 
uppstår. Om ägarna förutsätter att policyn kommer att vara ineffektiv för vinster mer än 42% av gångerna, 
kommer i sin tur avtal att misslyckas, vilket bekräftar behovet av tydliga och trovärdiga policys för 
utsläpp från regeringen (Nelson et al., 2015). 
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1. Introduction
The previous Australian government was celebrated for their world-leading climate policy when 
they introduced a national carbon tax on emissions in mid-2012. It was envisioned to transition 
into an emission trading scheme, to eventually be linked with other schemes throughout the 
world. Once implemented, Australia’s electricity generation from its traditional fleet of coal-
fired generation dramatically declined. Forced to incorporate the social cost of their emissions 
into their production decisions, owners instead chose to retire generation or mothball1 capacity 
(King, 2015). Their removal from the energy mix was largely replaced by cleaner generating 
technologies such as renewables whose cost competitiveness had dramatically improved. The 
achievement was short-lived, with the tax was repealed by the successive centre-right party that 
came to power (Department of the Environment and Energy, 2013). Since its removal in mid-
2014, coal-fueled power generation has once again increased along with their associated 
emissions, as mothballed coal generation has been brought back into operation (Figure 1.1). The 
reversal halted further investment in renewable technologies, whose levelised cost of electricity 
(LCOE)2 is much higher than incumbent coal when not made to account for their emissions 
(EPRI, 2015). This contributed to the government reducing the LRET3 which subsidses zero 
1 To reduce the plant’s output and operational costs by temporarily shutting down units of the total capacity. 
2 The levelised cost of electricity is a decision making tool that incorporates all the costs of a plant from initial 
investment to shut down compared with the MWh they can produce. 
3 The mandated Large-Scale Renewable Energy Target was reduced from 41000GW to 33000GW in 2015. 
Figure 1.1 – Recent Changes in Electricity Generation in the NEM 
Source: Saddler (2016)  
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emission technologies for large-scale power generation (Nelson et al., 2015). 
The 2015 Paris Climate Agreement recently led to the establishment of Australia’s CO2 emission 
reductions targets of 26-28% below 2005 levels by 2030 (Department of the Environment, 
2015). The Australian government has repeatedly expressed their lack of support for a price on 
carbon (Anderson, 2016), adamant that their environmental policy suite, ‘Direct Action Plan,’ 
will be capable to achieve the required reductions. Given their repeal of the previous 
government’s carbon tax it is hardly surprising, as backtracking provides major political 
problems. Despite this, there is mounting evidence projecting Australia will fail to meet these 
emission targets by a substantial margin given current emissions policy (Rocha et al., 2015; The 
Climate Institute, 2016).  
1.1 Victorian Brown Coal Generation in the NEM 
The Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) is one of the largest interconnected electricity 
grids in the world, covering all Australian States except The Northern Territory and Western 
Australia. It represents a wholesale market for the supply of electricity through distribution 
networks across the states from generators to retailers and end-users, accounting for 90% of 
Australia’s total electricity generation (AEMO, 2010). To supply the electricity in the market, the 
Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) collects bids from the generators in ascending price 
order4 for each dispatch period. Generators are then progressively scheduled to supply their 
electricity up to a point where cumulative supply of the bids meets the overall demand, with the 
final accepted bid setting the wholesale price of electricity which all generators receive (ibid). 
Australia has historically been heavily reliant on fossil fuels for electricity production, with more 
than 90% coming from coal, gas and oil. The Latrobe Valley (LV) lies in the Gippsland region of 
Victoria, home to one of the largest brown coal deposits in the world, with an estimated 33 
billion tonnes of economically viable brown coal remaining (MCA, 2014). As a result, electricity 
generation in Victoria has been traditionally dominated by an ageing fleet of sub-critical 
pulverised coal (SCPC) power plants utilising this fuel source. They have been shown to supply 
a baseload5 close to 50% of the state’s electricity (Caldecott et al., 2015). This fuel source is very 
cheap but has a very low energy content, producing higher greenhouse gas emissions than other 
                                                          
4 This is known as the ‘merit order’. 
5 Constantly operating the power plants to be included in the energy mix for all levels of demand. 
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forms when used in energy production (MCA, 2014). The combination of these ageing, 
inefficient plants fueled with highly-emitting brown coal, equates to these plants having some of 
the highest emission intensities6 in the OECD (WWF, 2005). 
Two of the highest emitting (Hazelwood and Yallourn) are vertically-integrated, owning both the 
power plant and their nearby mine from which they are sourced. With their 35+ year facility’s 
already paid off, their short-run marginal costs that dictate production decisions are often simply 
a function of their fuel costs (Ward, 2015). These extremely low operating costs mean that their 
bids to supply their electricity will almost always be accepted into the energy mix. In contrast to 
this when the carbon tax was in effect, it was estimated that these generators were operating 
close to break-even when excluding transitional support provided by the Australian government 
(Ward, 2015). LCOE projections to 2030 show that renewables will be competitive with CCS 
technologies, but marginally on par with non-CCS fossil fuel technologies with no carbon price 
(Brinsmead et al., 2014). Without a carbon price, it can be expected that these highly emitting 
brown coal plants will be cost effective up until the end of their expected plant lives into 2030. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In the last decade, the NEM has been faced with the problem of increasing overcapacity7 of 
generation as the demand for electricity has gradually fallen (Nelson et al., 2015). This has been 
attributed to factors like energy efficiency programs, structural change, and the response of 
electricity consumers to price rises such as increased uptake of residential solar (ibid;  Saddler, 
2015). Exacerbating this oversupply is the addition of renewable energy in line with the 
government’s Large-Scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET) (Jotzo & Mazouz, 2015; Nelson et 
al., 2015). 
With no carbon price, an ageing fleet of emission-intensive brown coal plants enjoy high 
capacity factors (the percentage of their capacity utlilised), when not made to account for the 
social cost of their emissions (Ward, 2015).  Furthermore, multiple barriers to exit have been 
identified for the incumbents further preventing efficient exits (AEMC, 2015a; Frontier 
Economics, 2015; Nelson et al., 2015). Instead, a disorderly exit is taking place in response to 
                                                          
6 This refers to tonnes of CO2 emitted per MWh of electricity sent-out or sold. 
7 The AEMO (2014) identified overcapacity of 2000-2200MW in Victoria where the LV power plants are based, 
and around 7,600MW for the entire NEM – recently supported by King (2016). 
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the overcapacity, with technologically more efficient, lower-emitting black coal plants being 
forced to retire or mothballed (Riesz & Noone, 2013). 
On Australia’s current emissions trajectory, an 82MtCO2e abatement gap has recently been 
identified to meet the 2030 emissions target (Climate Works, 2017). With a lack of effective 
emissions regulation for the electricity sector, commentators have recognised the need for an 
orderly brown coal phase-out plan, to allow for the transition to a cleaner electricity system 
(Caldecott et al., 2015; Denis et al., 2015; Jotzo & Mazouz, 2015; Nelson et al., 2015; King, 
2016). With an outlook of flattening demand (AEMO, 2016) and oversupply to be stretched by 
further additions of renewable supply in accordance with the RET, intervening for a plant exit is 
not seen to pose a threat to the security of the electricity supply in the short run (Nelson et al., 
2015). 
1.3 Objective and Hypothesis 
The main aim of this study is to determine whether cooperative bargaining will provide a 
solution to retire a highly-emitting lignite power plant under the threat of an emissions 
performance standard. Different stringencies of standards will be used to identify the setting that 
is optimal for the regulator to achieve an exit. Optimal abatement strategies between reducing 
output, or installing carbon capture and storage facilities will be determined in order to meet the 
regulation under disagreement. Finally, uncertainty is introduced over the regulation’s credibility 
to examine the effect this has on the outcome reached previously. If an agreement is reached, we 
expect more stringent standards to require less credibility when uncertainty is introduced for the 
agreement to be maintained. Due to the low take-up of CCS being in its infancy stages, we 
expect the cost will be too high compared with reducing output as has been observed in reality. 
1.4 Outline 
A review of literature on barriers to exit for the studied plants, the question of intervention and 
regulatory proposals is provided in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 will discuss cooperative bargaining and 
voluntary agreements, moving into the Nash Bargaining framework. The data, components and 
methodology of the cooperative bargaining game will be covered in Chapter 4, with the results 
and a discussion presented in Chapter 5. The main findings of the paper will be concluded in 
Chapter 6, with chapter 7 addressing areas of concern for further research. 
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2. Literature Review 
A lack of effective emissions regulation for the electricity sector has led to discussion over 
apparent ‘barriers to exit’8 for highly-emitting brown coal generation and the question of 
intervention (Frontier Economics, 2015; Nelson et al., 2015; King, 2016). AEMC (2015) claims 
that despite their existence, these barriers to exit have not deterred generators from exiting, and it 
should be left to the market to determine which plants should exit. This notion is supported by 
COAG (2014) who argue that intervention can be seen to transfer retirement costs on to 
consumers and tax-payers. However, the Senate Committee (2017) importantly acknowledged 
that although exits are still occurring in response to market signals, these barriers are problematic 
as they cause ‘disorderly exits’9, and support the investigation of policies to induce an exit. 
2.1 Barriers to Orderly Exits 
With high sunk costs of capital intensive plants, and  low SRMCs to determine operating 
decisions, plant owners have more flexibility in their level of output, and are able to see out 
periods of low demand better than higher-cost but technologically more efficient generators 
(Riesz & Noone, 2013). Compounding this is the presence of a ‘first mover disadvantage’ for the 
incumbents (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). Despite market signals of overcapacity and 
reduced demand, they hold out in the hope of a competitor deciding to retire, leading to benefits 
from expected increases in wholesale prices and their own output to cover the lost supply 
(Nelson et al., 2015). This is seen to have flow on effects, creating barriers to entry for new 
entrant renewable generation (Jotzo & Mazouz, 2015). 
Uncertainty over the expectantly sizeable decommissioning and rehabilitation costs at the 
retirement of the 35+ year plants and their mine sites is expected to constitute a further barrier 
(Environment Victoria, 2014). These costs are expected to exceed provisions made by their 
owners to meet the required clean-up by hundreds of millions of dollars (King, 2016), attributed 
to provisions being made on incorrect assumptions and the lack of regulatory obligations for the 
firms in meeting these costs (AEMC, 2015a). This leads to the plants delaying their exit in order 
to avoid fronting up to these costs for as long as possible. Recommendations from a recent senate 
                                                          
8 Defined as costs or foregone profits that a firm must bear if it leaves an industry,” (AEMC, 2015a). 
9 This refers to the retirements of newer and lower-emitting generation over technologically less-efficient and 
higher-emitting ones. 
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committee have called for a national audit on these costs, as well as a common approach to 
setting rehabilitation bonds to ensure costs are properly provisioned for (Senate Committee, 
2017). Further uncertainty surrounding the future direction of emissions regulation10 has created 
mixed-messages for plant owners on how to invest for the future (Nelson et al., 2015; Slezak & 
Farrer, 2016). This lack of clear policy direction has increased the ‘option value’ of waiting to 
determine future market conditions and regulation in the industry (Riesz & Noone, 2013). 
Nelson et al. (2015, 26) states the importance of clear articulation of the reasons for new policy 
to promote credibility. 
2.2 Government Emissions Policy 
It is seemingly clear that there are multiple forces all working to prevent an orderly exit of the 
aged generation capacity. The repealed carbon tax was estimated to come closest to accurately 
estimating the social costs of emissions of the Latrobe Valley plants, but still fell well short 
(Ward, 2015). Despite this, the brown coal generators of the Latrobe valley received assistance 
from the ‘Energy Security Fund,’ created to assist heavily impacted industries at its introduction, 
and avoid risks to energy security. The assistance has been since deemed unnecessary as security 
risks were actually relatively low (Mountain, 2013). Furthermore, the LV plants were calculated 
to have passed on 111% of the cost of the carbon tax to consumers which was much higher than 
forecast, so the assistance instead became additional profits for the plants (ibid). 
Since it’s repeal, the succeeding government’s emission reduction policy is centered around the 
‘Emission Reduction Fund (ERF),’using a reverse-auction mechanism to identify lowest-cost 
emission reduction projects for public funding (Department of the Environment, 2015). The 
policy has been heavily criticized for ignoring Australia’s fossil fuel-reliant energy industry 
(Jackson, 2014; King, 2016) which contributes 36% to Australia’s total carbon emissions 
(Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2010). Instead, winning lowest-cost bids are 
often focused around land reorganisation activities (such as afforestation)(CER, 2017a). Burke 
(2016) also raises serious concerns over its susceptibility to problems of adverse selection 
(Akerlof, 1970), where a project would have occurred regardless of the government paying for 
the reduction. Reductions purchased are protected by a ‘Safeguard Mechanism,’ ensuring other 
industries do not increase emissions above historical business as usual levels (AEMC, 2015b). 
                                                          
10 Such as the repeal of the carbon tax in 2014 and the failed payments for closure campaign of 2012. 
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However there have been revelations of serious flaws, with Environment Victoria (2015) 
calculating that emissions from coal fired power stations alone could theoretically increase 40-50 
million tonnes without it breaching the mechanism. 
The main policy targeting the electricity sector focuses on increasing Renewable energy, 
designed to complement the ERF and reduce emissions in the emission intensive electricity 
sector. The Large Scale Renewable Energy Target (LRET) originally mandated an amount of 
41000 GWh of additional renewable electricity generation by 2020, to achieve 23.5% of 
Australia’s energy from renewable sources (CER, 2017b). However falling demand for 
electricity and barriers to exit for coal incumbents caused overcapacity in the market, with the 
target was scaled back by 8000GW in 2015 (ibid). The original target was criticised for being set 
with little analytical rationale (Wood & Mullerworth, 2015), and that fixed additions of 
renewable generation to an oversupplied system do not incentivise an efficient energy mix 
(Nelson et al., 2015). Consequently, this regulatory uncertainty has served to exacerbate barriers 
of regulatory uncertainty for aging brown coal incumbents. There are growing calls for it to be 
developed past 2020 with bipartisan support, with clear rationale to achieve credibility of the 
policy and reduce uncertainty (Wood & Mullerworth, 2015; Senate Committee, 2017).  
2.3 Intervention for an exit 
The presence of barriers to exit for the ageing incumbents is widely accepted, and with lack of 
effective environmental policy targeting their emissions, there is mounting support for 
intervention to promote orderly and cost-effective exits. The first-best policy intervention is 
widely considered to be a price on carbon, creating a market to efficiently price the cost of 
abatement, and generate government revenue to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes and 
compensate heavily affected industries (Parry et al., 1997). Market mechanisms are able to 
uncover information asymmetries and therefore achieve targets more efficiently at lower cost 
than direct regulation (Jotzo & Mazouz, 2015). 
A cap and trade or emission trading scheme known as the ‘Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme,’ 
was failed to be implemented by the previous government in 2009 (Taylor, 2010). It was 
expected to have delivered the most efficient emission  reductions in a more politically 
acceptable form than that of a carbon tax (Weller, 2012). Their usefulness to cost-effectively 
reach emission goals is demonstrated in the Climate Institute (2016) report, estimating that a 
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modest carbon price rising to $40 by 2030 would be sufficient to achieve the 2030 emissions 
target. Recently, an Emission Intensity Scheme was propose by the Opposition in the lead up to 
the 2016 Federal Election (Australian Labour Party, 2016), and was the option ultimately 
recommended in the special review report by the CCA (2016). It sets a baseline emission 
standard that all generators must adhere to, similar to an emission performance standard across 
the industry, each issued with permits for their allowed emissions in line with the baseline on 
BAU generation. Those who are under the baseline can sell to those that are over, creating a 
market to trade certificates and an explicit price on carbon. 
 Despite these options offering efficient societal outcomes of lowest cost abatement, the current 
government have publicly stated that they will not pursue a price on carbon (Packham & Kaye, 
2016). This could be expected to stem from the political issues of backtracking on their repeal of 
the previous government’s price on carbon. Considering this, various second-best forms of 
intervention have emerged to achieve an orderly exit. Each needs to overcome hurdles of 
information asymmetry and questions of compensation size, while ensuring minimal impact on 
tax-payer funds and retail price rises (Jotzo & Mazouz, 2015).  
A pure or direct regulatory approach could be taken upon emission intensive power plants to 
police their emissions and possibly induce an exit. This may be in forms such as Emission 
Performance Standards on incumbents like the government’s policy for emission standards on 
new coal-fired generation (Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2010), mandating 
CCS on plants above a certain age or emission intensity (Johnson et al., 2015; CCA, 2016), or 
mandated closures based on age over a set period of time (Caldecott et al., 2015). These all 
require regular monitoring and compliance costs incurred by the regulator. However the main 
issue faced by the regulator are the information asymmetries to induce an cost effective 
retirement (Jotzo & Mazouz, 2015). While it can achieve significant emission reductions, the 
asymmetry can affect the correct level to set the regulation for efficient outcomes. Furthermore 
they are unlikely to impose the full cost of early closure on individual plants due to the current 
political climate (ibid). 
The COAG energy council considered re-visiting the previous government’s failed 2012 
‘Payment for Closure’ program (COAG, 2014) which aimed to facilitate the orderly exit of 
2000MW of highly emitting coal capacity (Riesz & Noone, 2013, p 9) . Closures are negotiated 
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between the government and power plant owners through compensation for future foregone 
profits. A similar scheme has been approved  by the European Commission to regulate out 
German lignite power plants over the next few years (European Commission, 2016). The 
Australian government’s program was plagued by information asymmetries between the 
government and the power plants and negotiations failed (Riesz & Noone, 2013). It also 
struggles with political acceptance of large payments of public funds to owners of old emission 
intensive power stations (Jotzo & Mazouz, 2015). Furthermore, it is criticised as creating a 
vicious cycle of expectations of future payments, creating barriers to exit for incumbents, and 
insignificant reductions in emissions due to another highly-emitting plant taking the exited 
plant’s place  (Riesz & Noone, 2013). 
The CCA (2016) has recently recommended adopting a market mechanism for the electricity 
sector due to their ability to be scalable and flexible. Incorporating elements of direct regulation 
leads to hybrid alternatives, which can still retain flexibility and efficiencies of market 
mechanisms. 
Caldecott et al. (2015) proposed publicly funded, time-lined closures operating in tandem with 
new emissions regulation on the plants. The regulation reduces compensation required as the 
new regulation limits owner expectations of future profits as well as targeting oldest plants first 
who have paid off their plants and are at the end of their technical lives (p.12). However it did 
not deal with the problem of covering the decommissioning and rehabilitation costs required to 
be paid to induce a closure. It also exacerbates the problem of incumbents holding out in 
anticipation of further compensation associated with publicly funded closures (Riesz & Noone, 
2013, p 20). It has been expressed by the COAG Energy council that they do not support 
assistance to generators for retirement (COAG, 2014, p 1).  
A reverse auction mechanism is briefly introduced by Caldecott et al.(2015) as an alternative and 
cost-effective way to retire SCPCs, whilst uncovering some information asymmetry between the 
owners and the regulator. Owners bid to receive a fixed price for each unit of generation capacity 
retired, with the lowest bid winning the auction. Jotzo and Mazouz (2015) have recently 
proposed a mechanism where generators secretly bid in this style for a mandated amount of their 
capacity to be closed. In contrast to Caldecott et al. (2015), payment includes a portion to cover 
expectantly large costs to retire operations and rehabilitate the plant and mine. The winning bid 
10 
 
is funded by the remaining generators proportional to their emissions. The authors argue that this 
will avoid the barrier to exit of publicly funded payments for closure schemes, but questions still 
remain over plants employing non-competitive bidding practices to reduce bid values and 
corresponding funding required, as well as levels of cost-pass through (ibid, p.11). 
This study proposes a fusion of these two hybrid mechanisms. Similar to reverse auctions but 
using a cooperative bargaining with only two players, it proposes to also avoid issues of 
information asymmetries for the regulator on compensation required and incorporate 
decommissioning and rehabilitation costs (the true extent of which are unknown to the public), 
whilst avoiding public funding and costs to the tax payer. It will avoid issues of colluding among 
the plants raised in Jotzo and Mazouz (2015)’s non-cooperative mechanism, but also 
incorporates the direct regulatory threat of an EPS to help limit required compensation in 
Caldecott et al. (2015).  Moreover, this paper will take the further step of modelling expected 
profits to ascertain the settings under which a plant exit is likely to be achieved. 
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3. Conceptual Framework 
Arimura et al. (2008) states that voluntary agreements (VAs) have been shown to be useful tool 
when there is opposition to the introduction of first-best policies, and in favourable conditions 
are able to achieve similar abatement levels (Schmelzer, 1999). The following section will look 
at the merits of cooperative bargaining to reach an agreement, following with the game 
theoretical framework of Nash Bargaining (Nash, 1950). 
3.1 Cooperative Bargaining 
A bargaining situation arises when a pair of players can engage in mutually beneficial trade 
faced with conflicting interests, but have a common interest to cooperate (Muthoo, 2001). VAs 
are suggested to be more flexible, effective and less costly than traditional command and control 
approaches (Arimura et al., 2008). Conditions for this usually depend on perfect information, 
credible threats of regulation, having one period of negotiations, and only one abatement 
technology (Schmelzer, 1999).  
An agreement will be in the firms best interest to do so, as profit motivated firms make voluntary 
agreements to avoid costs of regulation (Carraro & Leveque, 2013). This is combined with the 
benefit to the regulator avoiding compliance and enforcement costs for the mandatory abatement, 
increasing social benefits (Krarup, 2001). However for the VA to be a useful tool for the 
regulator, any agreement reached in emission reductions should not exceed emissions if 
subjected to the regulation (Schmelzer, 1999). 
Most research centers around VAs between firms and the state, demonstrated in Schmelzer 
(1999), with the state agreeing not to regulate by imposing standards on their emissions. The VA 
in our study will be between two highly-emitting power plants, with an agreement characterised 
by one compensating the other for retiring from the market. In this form, there is no 
compensation with public funds as with ‘payment for closure’ schemes. Where information is 
not perfect, Krarup (2001) notes that a crucial condition for efficiency of a VA depends on its 
ability to uncover information asymmetries for the regulator. The power plants can be expected 
to have symmetric information of one another due to their similar profiles, to a higher degree to 
what the regulator may be expected to have. This is further supported by detailed reputable 
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reporting from government bodies and independent consulting groups (ACIL Tasman, 2009; 
ACIL Allen, 2013, 2014; AEMO, 2013). 
Carraro & Leveque (2013) argue that environmental effectiveness of voluntary agreements is 
questionable in situations when the firms do not respect their targets or are set too low, drawing 
parallels with the importance of credibility of regulatory threats in Nelson et al. (2015). The EPS 
will be set lower than the plant’s emission intensities, placing a constraint on operations and 
materially impact profit to a level dependent on the EPS’s stringency. This credibility is also 
influenced by the monitoring and compliance effectiveness of the regulator under agreement and 
facing the regulation (Stranlund, 2010; Carraro & Leveque, 2013). If the exiting plant does not 
respect the agreement for closure, it will obviously be clear to the regulator. An agreed exit from 
the market should only require compliance surrounding the agreed timing of the exit. On the 
other hand for non-agreement, this is handled with the ongoing comprehensive monitoring and 
reporting as mentioned. It can be reasonably accepted that the plants will not be able to shirk on 
their responsibilities. 
Krarup (2001) acknowledges that if a government is pro-firm and the firms have influence in the 
forming of regulation, environmental targets are susceptible to being lowered. In this case, a 
voluntary agreement may help to avoid a distorted piece of legislation for the government 
(Glachant, 2007). A VA may be a reasonable compromise to handle the state of ‘political 
paralysis’(Weller, 2012, p 1262) in emissions policy for the Latrobe Valley, and Australian coal 
industry’s lobbying power with the government. There is also the risk that a polluter will enter 
into negotiations for an agreement to delay the legislation due to the time it takes to implement 
and enact the legislation (Glachant, 2007). The period of the negotiations must be relatively short 
and avoid being prolonged. Nelson et al. (2014) emphasises this with the need of the regulator to 
move swiftly from announcement to implementation and minimise regulatory uncertainty. 
A risk with VAs, as experienced with payment for closure schemes, is in how to avoid further 
expectations of compensation that strengthen barriers to exit (Riesz & Noone, 2013). Despite a 
voluntary agreement in our case referring to payment from another generator rather than public 
funds, this may still act to cause generators to delay exit and strengthening barriers to exit (Riesz 
& Noone, 2013). The regulator needs to send a clear message that this will be the one and only 
round of a regulated closure, involving the two highest emission intensive generators in the 
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market. This message is supported by the degree of overcapacity in the market and will be 
almost eliminated by a closure in Victoria (AEMO, 2014), including the continuation of natural 
closures of generation capacity as a response to market signals. 
Game theory has been shown to be a useful tool for investigating voluntary agreements, as it is 
founded on optimal decision making with rational agents (Schmelzer, 1999). We follow this with 
the framework of Nash Bargaining to study the cooperative bargaining problem. 
3.2 Nash Bargaining 
A two-person bargaining problem involving collaboration for mutual benefit can be modelled 
using Nash Bargaining (Nash, 1950) – using utility theory in a game theoretical context to 
bargain over a potential surplus between the two firms (Morgenstern et al., 1953). Nash assumes 
the two players are highly rational, each can compare desires for various things, equality in 
bargaining skill, and full knowledge of tastes and preferences of the other. 
In our bargaining game, the two firms who own the power are profit maximizing entities and can 
therefore be considered highly rational. Both generators have similar profiles that include the 
state of the technology used and it’s efficiency, the location of the plants and the mine sites are in 
the same location, as well as regular reputable reporting from various government agencies on 
costing data and market changes. In this regard, both should have similar expectations of the 
other and are assumed to have complete information, including tastes and preferences and the 
ability to compare tastes and preferences of the other firm (Nash, 1950).  
Nash (1950) idealises bargaining skill as being equal between the two generators. Both are large 
generators supporting a large work-force as well as acting as a commercial centre for the local 
community. Their close proximity with each other means this community impact is inter-twined. 
Both generators are considered highly-emitting, however Yallourn’s emission intensity is 
marginally lower by 0.11t CO2-e/MWh, and therefore ‘cleaner’ or more emissions efficient at 
producing electricity. In contrast with this, the Hazelwood plant operates a generating capacity 
that is 150MW greater than Yallourn’s, and employs more workers and can be seen to have a 
higher community impact. We assume that these differences offset each other when examining 
bargaining skill within the confines of the bargaining game. In addition to this, there is a time 
allowed for the two generators to cooperate as set by the government. Therefore, neither has an 
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upper hand over the other on a matter of time and patience which can lead to bargaining power 
(Muthoo, 2001). 
Muthoo (2001) refers to a unique outcome for each bargaining situation in some class of 
bargaining situations. The solution of the bargaining problem will determine the amount of 
satisfaction each individual should expect from the opportunity to bargain, aiming to maximise 
the product of surplus utilities in the two-person bargaining game (Nash, 1950). If any surplus is 
found to exist, the bargaining solution will determine how this surplus will be split amongst the 
parties in the terms of the agreement (Anderlini, 2015). 
To achieve this, Nash (1950) developed an axiomatic approach to bargaining, which abstracted 
away from the details of the process of bargaining and considers only the set of outcomes or 
agreements that satisfy the following reasonable properties; (i) the solution must be pareto-
efficient, as an inefficient outcome would expected to lead to renegotiation, (ii) if everything is 
symmetric in the bargaining problem, the agreement should not discriminate and pick out a 
symmetric solution, (iii) a transformation of the utility functions of either player which maintains 
order of preferences should not alter the bargaining process outcome, and finally (iv) 
Independence or Irrelevant alternatives states that the optimal solution of a first set of possible 
agreements can ignore alternatives of a larger second set if, if this second set contains the entire 
first set and it’s optimal solutions is the same as the solution of the first set. 
A function that satisfies these axioms will pick out a unique solution from any 2 player (i=1,2) 
bargaining problem B = (U,d) where U is a convex and compact set of the possible agreements 
in terms of utilities for 1 and 2: (u1,u2) ∈ U, and d is a pair (d1,d2) resulting in the utilities for 1 
and 2 from failure of the bargaining known as the ‘disagreement point’ with d ∈ U. There exists 
an agreement u ∈ U for that u1 > d1 and u2 > d2 which ensures a mutually beneficial agreement. 
The Nash Product devised by Nash (1950) is the furthest north-easterly hyperbola with 
asymptotes equal to the disagreement points of the two players, that touches the maximand of  
the bargaining set of possible utilities for the two individuals (Anderlini, 2015). The point where 
it touches will provide the Nash Bargaining solution (u1N,u2N) as shown in figure 3.1. 
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This is represented mathematically by the following constrained maximization problem: 
Max (u1,u2):  (u1 – d1)(u2 – d2) s.t. (u1,u2) ∈ U    (1) 
As we have assumed that there exists symmetric information between the plants, a split the 
difference rule applies as shown in Muthoo (2001) where the parties receive the value of their 
disagreement points and agree to split the remaining surplus. 𝜋 refers to the utility received for 
the player making the offer to the other. The utilities are then calculated as follows.  
 U1N = d1N + ½ (𝜋 – d1 + d2) and  U2N = d2N + ½ (𝜋 – d1 + d2)   (2) 
With the assumptions made, Nash Bargaining can be idealised between the studied power plants, 
in order to find a mutually beneficial agreement that is the pareto-efficient outcome (Nash, 
1950). 
 
Figure 3.1 – A graphical representation of the Nash Bargaining 
Solution. Source: Anderlini (2015)  
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4. Model Specifications and Approach 
4.1 Plant Profiles 
Hazelwood and Yallourn11 are the two of largest and most emission intensive power plants in the 
NEM, and are therefore chosen as the two plants to participate in our case study (WWF, 2005). 
They are both vertically-integrated mine-mouthed12 operated power plants (Energy Australia, 
2016; GDF Suez, 2016a) . Emission Intensities are calculated using emissions intensities based 
on electricity sent-out13 data as opposed to electricity generated which includes electricity 
consumed by the plant for its operation (ACIL Tasman, 2016). Hazelwood operates with an 
emission intensity of 1.53t CO2 per MWh sent-out and Yallourn with 1.42t CO2 per MWh (ACIL 
Tasman, 2009). Loy Yang B is a third cleaner SCPC in the Latrobe Valley and is also owned by 
GDF Suez, so effects of an agreement on this plant will also be incorporated for GDF Suez 
profits. Loy Yang B power plant is not a mine-mouthed operation, instead fueled by the Loy 
Yang Mine owned by AGL energy running higher fuel costs as a result (GDF Suez, 2016b). The 
expected operating life of the plants is set for 2031 for Hazelwood and 2032 for Yallourn 
(Energy Australia, 2016; GDF Suez, 2016a) which is used for calculating NPVs independent of 
an operating license extension (see CCS in section 4.5). 
4.2 Data 
The AEMO has produced reports via government agencies with detailed profile data on the 
incumbent plants operating in the NEM including; CO2 emission factors, fuel costs, variable 
operating and maintenance (VOM), fixed operating and maintenance (FOM), expected cost 
changes with Carbon Capture and Storage (ACIL Tasman, 2009; ACIL Allen, 2014).  Fuel costs 
are converted from $/GWh to $/MWh based on thermal efficiency and an average capacity factor 
of 70% (ibid). These VOM and FOM costs are expected to remain flat for their operating life, 
with low risk due to the vertical integration and the power plants fully owned (Jotzo & Mazouz, 
2015). Wholesale electricity prices were projected out from data in Caldecott et al. (2015) which 
uses linear regression analysis of average wholesale prices in NEM territories with SCPCs over 
                                                          
11 Hazelwood is owned by GDF Suez and Yallourn by Energy Australia. 
12 The lignite mine sits alongside the power plant, allowing for low transportation costs of fuel. 
13 Referred to as electricity sold in the market. 
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the period 1998-2015. These increases are assumed to continue at the resultant rate of $.79 per 
year, with a baseline assumption of $41.015 per MWh for 2016. 
Jotzo and Mazouz (2015) report on average capacity factors dropping to 70% for 2014 due to the 
recent falling electricity demand coupled with exogenous shocks such as mine fires and flooding 
disruptions to operations. Furthermore, demand is expected to flatten out over the following 
decades (Brinsmead et al., 2014; AEMO, 2016). This capacity factor is taken as the BAU setting 
in our study. In the event of a plant exit with Jotzo and Mazouz (2015)’s mechanism, they 
assume a 10% increase in output for the remaining LV brown coal plants, resulting in capacity 
factors of 77% for Hazelwood or Yallourn in the agreement scenario. The authors expect black 
coal to make-up the remainder lost generation with an emission factor of 0.91t CO2-e/MWh, 
supported by a recent emission factors update (ACIL Allen, 2016). Baseload power plants are 
expected to operate 24 hours a day due to low MCs and high ramp-down and ramp-up costs14 
(Ward, 2015), which is used to calculation expected dispatched generation at the 70% capacity 
factor. This generation figure multiplied by their emission intensity provides their expected 
annual emissions. A tax rate of 21% is taken along with the discount rate used of 9% as is used 
as in Caldecott et al. (2015)’s payments for closure estimates for all SCPCs in the NEM. They 
expect their discount rate to be conservative to provide the regulator with extra assurance on the 
maximum amount needed to be paid to close these plants. Due to risk of future emission controls 
by subsequent governments this rate could be expected to be higher.  
4.3 Decommissioning and Rehabilitation Costs 
There is much uncertainty surround the end-of-life clean-up costs for the plants and their mines. 
Specifically, this refers to the decommissioning and rehabilitation costs of both the plant and the 
mine sites. For an agreement to be successful, it must incorporate these costs into the offer made 
to the other plant. While there is much uncertainty in public knowledge about these costs, the 
plants themselves are expected to have relatively accurate estimates of their own and each 
other’s costs due to their similar profiles. Current rehabilitation bonds in place by the owners are 
expected to fall well short at the scheduled closure date, as plants try to downplay their true costs 
in the public eye (Slezak & Farrer, 2016). This provides an incentive for the plant to accept an 
offer. A number of Environment Victoria (2014) reported expected mine rehabilitation costs as a 
                                                          
14 Costs associated with shutting down and starting up operations respectively 
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high-case scenario of $200m. Recently, AECOM (2015) suggested even more conservative 
figures with a ‘conservative but realistic’ estimate that expects with an 80% probability that the 
actual cost is less than the nominated amount (P80). Our study will take this estimate to help to 
assure the regulator that there is low risk of an agreement failing due to underestimating these 
costs. These mine costs are in addition to expected plant decommissioning and rehabilitation 
costs taken from AEMO (2014) with specific estimates for Hazelwood and Yallourn of $80,000 
per MWh capacity. 
4.4 Emission Performance Standards  
The government previously proposed new-entrant coal generation meet a ‘best practice emission 
standard’ of 0.86t CO2-e/MWh (Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2010). 
Concerns over the stringency level effect on CCS technology development and forcing plants to 
commit to unproven technologies caused it to be shelved (Talberg & Nielson, 2011). Our study 
proposes the policy is only implemented on two of the worst power plants to improve their 
emission performance marginally with cleaner plants. Yallourn and Hazelwood have emission 
intensities of 1.42 and 1.53t CO2-e/MWh respectively. The other two major LV SCPC brown 
coal power plants, Loy Yang A and Loy Yang B, are considerably more efficient emitting 1.22 
and 1.24t CO2-e/MWh respectively (ACIL Tasman, 2009) attributed to them being 10-20 years 
younger. Our study has selected the ‘low stringency’ performance standard to be met as 1.2t 
CO2-e/MWh – a reduction of 0.33t CO2-e/MWh for Hazelwood and 0.22t CO2-e/MWh for 
Yallourn. This forces them to operate to a level that would move them from the IEA’s 
classification of ‘old inefficient subcritical’ to ‘old efficient’15 (IEA, 2012). The stringencies are 
then incrementally increased by 0.1t CO2-e/MWh for the medium and high scenarios, equating to 
standards of 1.1 and 1.2t CO2-e/MWh respectively.  
4.5 The Offer  
To avoid the emission performance standard being implemented on the plants, the government 
allows a short pre-determined bargaining period for negotiations between the plants to agree for 
one to pay the other to exit the market. We also assume the regulator guarantees Hazelwood and 
Yallourn that they If they agree on an exit, the government guarantees the successor will not be 
subjected to future rounds of regulated closures and may emit freely (assumed to exclude 
                                                          
15 Classified as: old inefficient ≥ 1.34t CO2-e/MWh, and old efficient between 1.12-1.34t CO2-e/MWh. 
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expansions) to encourage an agreement. They are not immune to future first-best industry-wide 
policy. This avoids issues raised in Carraro & Leveque (2013) of shirking on the VA as the plant 
is retiring from the market and is no longer a participant. It also benefits the regulator by 
reducing their monitoring and compliance costs in the case of agreement. However, this will only 
be accepted by the government if the expected overall emissions are lower from an agreement 
compared to expected emissions from disagreement and facing the regulation (Schmelzer, 1999). 
The offer made by a plant will be affected by the expectation that the other will be able to 
survive financially with the new regulation. One plant will not offer a payment for exit to another 
if they knew that when faced with the actual regulation they would make a decision to exit 
anyway. An offer made is expected to be less than what the offeror would receive in the case of 
the other plant leaving and the offeror’s expected NPV of future profits. Likewise, a successful 
offer is expected to be more than the amount received by the offeree under disagreement, 
otherwise they would prefer to face the regulation. Additionally, the offer also must include the 
upfront cost of the decommissioning and rehabilitation for the exiting plant as with the hybrid 
mechanism of Jotzo and Mazouz (2015). This can be represented with plant i,j as:  
Mi (e)OR/CC + Di ≤ Xi ≤ Mj (i exit)    (3) 
This cost Di is also deducted from future profits at the end of the plant i’s life, which is included 
in Mi (e)OR/CC. This is discounted at the rate of 9%, so it is much less than the upfront cost for 
plant j. This condition can also be represented in terms of equation (2), where the share of the 
surplus for the exiting plant i incorporated into Xi, must be greater or equal than their 
decommissioning and rehabilitation costs Di: 
½ (Mj (i exit) – di + dj) ≥ Di     (4) 
Nelson et al. (2015, p.39) states that generators should theoretically be indifferent between 
operating and closing if they receive an income stream equal to their expected operating income, 
or it may even be preferred as it removes operational risk such as outages. 
4.6 Disagreement Points 
Abatement options to meet the regulation threatened by the government and which will 
determine the NPVs of expected profits under a disagreement scenario consist of – reduction of 
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their output, or, installation of Carbon Capture and Storage Technology (CCS). The cheaper 
alternative or combination of the two will act as the disagreement point. 
Output reduction or mothballing of capacity, refers to the plants acting as if they were cleaner by 
limiting their emissions from their base level (BAU) of output to what they would be if they 
were under the set emission standard, shown in equation (5). 
஻஺௎ ௢௨௧௣௨௧ ௫ ௦௘௧ ௘௠௜௦௦௜௢௡ ௦௧௔௡ௗ௔௥ௗ
௔௖௧௨௔௟ ௘௠௜௦௦௜௢௡ ௜௡௧௘௡௦௜௧௬
= 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡  (5) 
This results in further mothballing of plant capacity as the capacity factors are reduced from the 
BAU 70% level. The cost to the plants is the foregone profit from the lost generation in meeting 
the emissions standard. 
CCS is still an emerging technology which captures carbon emissions before they are released 
into the atmosphere and sequestering it in a safe storage sites. It is important to include the 
viability of CCS in our study, as the government has recently stated that coal will remain an 
integral part of Australia’s energy mix for the foreseeable future (Murphy, 2017). The first 
commercial grade post-combustion CCS facility operating since October 2014, is installed on a 
139MW unit of SaskPower’s Boundary Dam Facility in Saskatchewan, Canada (SaskPower, 
2016). It shares similar characteristics as a 35+ year old highly-emitting, brown coal-fueled 
power plant, making it an ideal candidate to model for the plants in this study.  
The modelling of Carbon Capture and Storage of CO2 on the world’s first commercial grade CCS 
facility requires numerous assumptions. Viability of installation on ageing generators requires 
refurbishment, which constitutes 30% of SaskPower’s A$1.249bn cost. SaskPower announced 
that the project could be completed at a 20-30% discount due to the learning efficiencies (MIT, 
2016). We conservatively estimate a 15% reduction in costs with technology improving, but due 
to the larger sized units in this study. According to government reports, we allow for a 15 year 
operating license extension for the generators and their mines with the installation of CCS (ACIL 
Allen, 2013). A 10% parasitic load16 is estimated as an expected improvement from Boundary 
Dam (MIT, 2016). Installation of CCS is limited to the whole capacity of a generating unit. 
SaskPower installed their CCS on a refurbished unit of 139MW capacity, whereas Hazelwood 
                                                          
16 The foregone dispatchable energy due to its use in operating the CCS facility. 
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consists of 8 x 200MW units, and Yallourn 350MW and 375MW capacity units. As a result, the 
installation cost is estimated by extrapolating out discounted costs to these sized units. VOM and 
FOM costs are expected to increase for CCS installed on the entire plant capacity by $6 MWh 
and $5.13/MWh (ACIL Allen, 2014). Although these costs change their place in the merit order, 
the magnitude of the change in SRMC due to increased VOM which controls operating decisions 
(Ward, 2015) is not expected to remove them from the merit order to meet demand (Brinsmead 
et al., 2014, p 28). CO2 storage in this study assumes use of the Australian and Victorian 
government funded ‘CarbonNet Project, a feasibility study on a commercial grade piping system 
from the LV to the Gippsland Offshore Basin for safe storage (VIC Government, 2016). The 
CO2 capture rate from Boundary Dam has averaged 90% and is also assumed in this study (MIT, 
2016). 
4.7 Regulatory Uncertainty 
An important aspect of the cooperative bargaining game is that the threat of regulation needs to 
be credible. Recent uncertainty in the political landscape of Australia has affected credibility of 
environmental policies (Riesz & Noone, 2013; Nelson et al., 2015; Senate Committee, 2017).  A 
credible threat increases the likelihood of the bargaining game running effectively, and reaching 
an agreement which is the optimal outcome for the government. If the threat is considered weak 
by the polluters, they will prefer to face the regulation. Glachant (2007) states that credible 
threats ensure compliance, otherwise polluters may use a VA as a strategy to delay legislation 
with no intension of abating. This is not seen as a risk for our study as previously stated that if a 
VA is reached, a plant will permanently retire from the market by a set date. It may also be 
assumed that the plants are subjected to harsh monetary penalties or loss of mining licenses to 
help alleviate credibility concerns in the event of non-compliance with an emission standard. 
Counteracting this is the high degree of lobbying power of the coal industry demonstrated with 
the recent announcement of the government’s backing for ‘clean coal’ or CCS (Edis, 2017), 
which could influence and weaken the regulation’s stringency or penalties set (Caldecott et al., 
2015, p 28). Uncertainty would be further limited if bipartisan support for the policy was 
obtained (Wood & Mullerworth, 2015), as changes in government may see the policy repealed or 
replaced. A repeal should be considered unlikely however, as the centre-left opposition have 
supported even more stringent policies such as an emission intensity schemes (Australian Labour 
Party, 2016). 
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This study will introduce uncertainty by way of probabilities to represent anticipations (Nash, 
1950) of the emission standard being effectively implemented. This in turn will impact upon the 
expected profit calculated in the different scenarios. We introduce probability p that the policy 
will be introduced or remain in place. This can also be thought of as the amount of time that the 
policy is expected to be introduced on future profits, and 1-p serves as the expectation that the 
policy will not be implemented and profits will correspond to the base case scenario. A lower p 
increases the value of the threat point17, and increases the likelihood of the bargaining failing. 
4.8 The Nash Bargaining Game 
Utility is measured by each dollar the firm receives under the cases. Using the stated data and 
assumptions, the firms will calculate the Net Present Values of their expected profits for the 
Agreement scenarios and Disagreement scenarios under the different emission standards. Each 
plant then offers the other a payment to exit the market. 
 
Variables: 
i,j   Plant (H,Y) 
Mj (condition) NPV of income for plant i, dependent on: emission constraint, 
plant exit 
Dj   Decommissioning and rehabilitation cost of plant and mine of i 
Xi Total offer paid to plant i 
Ui   Agreement utility of plant i 
diCCS   Disagreement utility for plant i from CCS 
diOR   Disagreement utility for plant i from output reduction 
e   Emission performance standard (constraint) 
p   Probability of emission constraint being imposed 
 
First we will calculate the values of the agreement payoffs and disagreement payoffs: 
Agreement Pairs (UH, UY): 
H offering Y to exit:    
[MH (Y exit) – XY, XY] s.t. (MYOR/CC (e) + DY ≤ XY ≤ MH (Y exit))    (6) 
                                                          
17 This is also known as the disagreement point or disagreement outcome. 
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Y offering H to exit:    
[MY (H exit) – XH, XH] s.t. (MHOR/CC (e) + DY ≤ XH ≤ MY (H exit))    (7) 
 
Disagreement pairs (dH,dY): 
i) Carbon Capture (dHCC, dYCC):  
[p (MHCC (e)) + (1 – p) MH (no constraint), p (MYCC (e)) + (1 – p) MY(no constraint)] (8) 
ii) Output Reduction (dHOR, dYOR)  
[p (MHOR (e)) + (1 – p) MH (no constraint), p (MYOR (e)) + (1 – p) MY (no constraint)] (9) 
 
The disagreement pair that optimises net profit (if the bargaining results in disagreement) is 
selected to be used in the bargaining game. 
4.8.1 No uncertainty case 
We let p=1 for 100% credibility of the regulatory threat. 
I. For scenario where Hazelwood offers Yallourn payment to exit: 
With symmetric information, we substitute the agreement and chosen disagreement values into 
equations in (2): 
UHN = dH + ½ (MH (Y exit) – dH + dY), XY = UYN = dYN + ½ (MH (Y exit) – dH + dY) (10) 
 
If condition in expression (3) is met, then an agreement is reached between the plants and an exit 
is achieved. 
II. Repeat (I.) for alternative of Yallourn offering Hazelwood payment to exit 
4.8.2 Uncertainty case 
We now let p exist s.t. 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, representing regulatory credibility for plant owners. We 
examine this on the emission standards that induce an exit, which is optimal for a regulator. We 
solve for the point where the credibility of the threat (p) weakens to the point where the offeree is 
indifferent between remaining in, or leaving the market, represented by the offer from expression 
(3): 
     Xi = MiCC/OR (e) + Di     (11) 
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We then substitute (11), and the agreement and disagreement pairs from the optimal stringency 
for an exit, into the Nash Product from equation (1): 
ƒ(X,p) = [Mj (i exit) – (Di + MiCC/OR (e)) – (p MjCC/OR(e) + (1 – p) Mj (no constraint))] [(Di + 
MiCC/OR (e)) – (p MiCC/OR(e) + (1 – p) Mi (no constraint))]     (12) 
 
We optimize and solve for p, using the 2nd derivative to test for a local minimum. If this is met, 
the value for p will be the level of uncertainty at which the agreement will fail. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
Table 5.1 – Base Case Scenario Outcomes 
 
Examining the BAU setting with an assumed average capacity factor of 70%, resulting 
generation leads to base CO2 emissions of 15,011kt for Hazelwood and 12,887kt for Yallourn, or 
27,898kt of CO2 emissions in total. This combined amount is the important reference level for 
the government. For cooperative bargaining under an emissions threat to be an effective tool, any 
outcome from the bargaining game needs to lead to a material lowering of emissions below this 
reference level (Schmelzer, 1999). 
5.1 Disagreement Outcomes 
We first determine the baseline level of emissions set under the emission performance standards, 
and the corresponding generation allowed for the plants based on their emission intensities 
(Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 – Emissions and Generation allowed under the EPS  
 
As Hazelwood generates emissions at a rate of 1.53t CO2-e/MWh, it consumes its allowed 
emissions (eqn. (5)) at a faster rate than Yallourn at 1.42t CO2-e/MWh. The constraint is tougher 
against a dirtier plant than a cleaner one, reducing the larger capacity advantage that Hazelwood 
held over Yallourn. This effect increases as the emission standards stringency increases. For 
perspective, under the BAU scenario Yallourn generates 735,840 MWh p.a. less than 
Hazelwood, whereas under a 1.2t CO2-e standard, this gap dramatically reduces to 26,000MWh 
less than Hazelwood. 
Base Case (BAU) Hazelwood Yallourn Totals
Capacity factor 70% 70%
Generation sent-out (MWh) 9,811,200                    9,075,360                    18,886,560                 
Emissions (kt) 15,011                          12,887                          27,898                         
Life Income (NPV) 1,082,030,561$         1,122,468,539$          2,204,499,100$        
Generation Allowed (MWh)
E Stds HazelwoodYallourn Total Hazelwood Yallourn Total Hazelwood Yallourn
1 9,811      9,075      18,887  6,412,549 6,391,099  12,803,648 46% 49%
1.1 10,792    9,983      20,775  7,053,804 7,030,208  14,084,012 50% 54%
1.2 11,773    10,890    22,664  7,695,059 7,669,318  15,364,377 55% 59%
Capacity FactorsEmission Allowed (kt)
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5.1.1 Output Reduction 
We now determine the values for the disagreement pairs (di,dj) that result from plant owners 
choosing to mothball capacity to the levels from Table 5.2: 
Table 5.3 – Output reduction outcomes 
 
As stringency increases and capacity is mothballed, the plants earn less income as their 
generation dispatched is constricted. Each still earns positive net profit under all constraint 
stringencies, representing the ability of these plants to be able to ‘sweat out’18 operations and still 
remain profitable (Nelson et al., 2015). Emissions are expected to be less in practice so that the 
plants don’t run too close to the baseline and risk penalties. This would further reduce threat 
point values and increase the likelihood of an agreement. The reduced output is replaced by 
predominantly lower-emitting black coal plants (0.91t CO2-e/MWh), and an increase in the 
capacity factor of 10% from the remaining three LV brown coal plants (Jotzo & Mazouz, 2015; 
ACIL Allen, 2016). If the plants are faced with the weaker standard of 1.2t CO2 emitted per 
MWh, total emissions are 26,534kt of CO2 p.a., which represents a saving of 1,364kt of CO2 or 
4.9% annually over the base case. With the medium stringency of 1.1t CO2 emitted per MWh, 
corresponding emissions are 25,811kt of CO2 p.a, representing a saving of 2,088kt of CO2 or 
7.5% annually. The most stringent case of 1.0t CO2 emitted per MWh, emissions generated are 
25,087kt of CO2 equating to savings of 2,811kt of CO2 over the base case.  These reductions are 
not substantial, owing to the fact that Hazelwood and Yallourn still retain relatively high 
capacity factors (Table 5.2) in all the modelled emission standards. For the regulator to achieve 
                                                          
18 The owners temporarily shut down some of the generating capacity in periods of low demand. 
With Output 
Reduction Hazelwood Yallourn
Make-up 
Generation* Totals
Emissions 
Saving (%)
1.2 t-e CO2/MWh Life Income (NPV) 491,996,417$             665,309,715$             1,157,306,132$       
Cost NPV (lost income) 735,368,813$             622,591,656$             1,357,960,470$       
Emissions p.a. (kt) 11,773                          10,890                          3,870               26,534                        
E saved p.a. (kt) 3,238                            1,997                             1,364                          4.9%
1.1 t-e CO2/MWh Life Income (NPV) 311,819,738$             480,834,102$             792,653,839$           
Cost NPV (lost income) 1,159,899,441$         968,153,473$             2,128,052,914$       
Emissions p.a. (kt) 10792 9983 5,035               25,811                        
E saved p.a. (kt) 4,219                            2,904                             2,088                          7.5%
1 t-e CO2/MWh Life Income (NPV) 131,001,918$             295,611,534$             426,613,452$           
Cost NPV (lost income) 1,432,159,917$         1,247,906,799$          2,680,066,716$       
Emissions p.a. (kt) 9,811                            9,075                             6,200               25,087                        
E saved p.a. (kt) 5,200                            3,812                             2,811                          10.1%
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higher emission reductions under output reduction, more stringent standards must be taken which 
would be unlikely to be implemented due to the high influence of the coal industry in the 
Australian political scene (Edis, 2017). A weaker emission standard of 1.2 tCO2-e/MWh is the 
most likely to eventuate, considering it also brings the plants in line with similar brown coal 
generators19 in the Latrobe Valley. 
Still, the primary goal for the regulator is to achieve a plant exit. Regulated mothballing, while 
stronger than voluntary  mothballing, provides a weaker signal to new renewable generating 
capacity to enter the market in comparison to a plant exit where capacity is permanently removed 
(Riesz & Noone, 2013).  
5.1.2 Carbon Capture and Storage 
SaskPower’s investment cost for the CCS project was A$1.249bn for a 139MW capacity facility 
which included a refurbishment of the generator (SaskPower, 2012). The discounted cost is 
extrapolated out for the different sizes of Hazelwood and Yallourn’s generating units in 
increments shown in Table 5.4, adjusting for the exchange rate. We also check if there are any 
optimal strategy combinations of CCS installation and mothballing of capacity. 
Table 5.4 - CCS investment cost (modelled from SaskPower's Boundary Dam facility) 
Ex rate: 1 AUD = 0.9925 CAD (23rd August 2017) 
                                                          
19 Loy Yang A and Loy Yang B have emission factors of 1.22 and 1.24 t CO2 per MWh sent-out respectively (ACIL 
Tasman, 2009). 
CCS INVESTMENT COST
Hazelwood Yallourn
Unit size (MW) E(cost) Unit size (MW) E(cost)
200 1,527,850,211.80$           350 2,673,737,870.65$  
400 3,055,700,423.60$           700 5,347,475,741.29$  
600 4,583,550,635.40$           
800 6,111,400,847.19$           
28 
 
 
Table 5.5 - CCS Outcomes 
 
CCS achieves much larger emission reductions from the BAU scenario than reducing output 
manages. The units with CCS installed are expected to captures 90% of emissions (SaskPower, 
2016) which delivers much cleaner electricity to the market. Furthermore, no reduction in 
capacity means that there is no covering brown or black generation required which keeps 
emissions relatively high. Despite this, these achievements are overshadowed by the technology 
remaining prohibitively expensive for the generators. All of Yallourn’s CCS combinations earn 
negative net income, despite the extension in its operating life. Hazelwood earns positive net 
income when installing on the 200MW unit with $402.3bn, but any additional rollouts also result 
in negative net income over its life. Yallourn is less flexible with the rollout of CCS due to its 
generating units of 350MW being almost double the size of Hazelwood’s. Still, if the 
government was to threaten a 1.2t CO2-e/MWh EPS, installing 200MW of CCS for Hazelwood 
does not meet the baseline emissions of 11,773kt, whereas mothballing to reach the baseline 
level earns net income of $492 and is the dominant strategy. Based on the first commercial CCS 
facility in operation, the results show that the technology is not cost effective enough for the 
plants to consider investing at this stage. Boundary Dam’s decision to invest may be explained 
by their operations being supported by a secondary income stream from the on-selling of their 
captured CO2 for enhanced oil recovery (MIT, 2016). We have kept the same discount rate for 
CCS income as for the other income streams in our analysis. It could also be argued that the 
income from the CCS technology should be discounted at a higher rate due to the option value 
they retain of waiting to invest at a later date once the technology has improved, further 
compounding the weakness of CCS.  
CCS Installed (H/Y) Hazelwood Yallourn
Make-up 
Generation* Totals
Emissions 
Saving (%)
200 MW/350MW Life Income (NPV) 402,332,267$             (564,465,752)$            (162,133,485)$         
Cost NPV 825,032,963$             1,852,367,124$          N/A 2,677,400,086$       
Emissions p.a. (kt) 13,322                          10,144                          23,467                        
E saved p.a. (kt) 1,689                            2,743                             4,432                          15.9%
400 MW/350MW Life Income (NPV) (833,307,733)$           (564,465,752)$            (1,397,773,485)$     
Cost NPV 2,060,672,963$         1,852,367,124$          N/A 3,913,040,087$       
Emissions p.a. (kt) 11,634                          10,144                          21,778                        
E saved p.a. (kt) 3,378                            2,743                             6,120                          21.9%
600MW/700MW Life Income (NPV) (1,950,418,808)$        (2,723,269,925)$        (4,673,688,733)$     
Cost NPV 3,177,784,038$         4,011,171,297$          N/A 7,188,955,334$       
Emissions p.a. (kt) 9,945                            7,401                             17,346                        
E saved p.a. (kt) 5,066                            5,486                             10,552                        37.8%
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5.1.3 Disagreement Point Selection 
The dominant strategy for Hazelwood and Yallourn under all emission standards is mothballing 
of capacity and its values will be used for the disagreement points as shown in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 - Dominant strategies and values for disagreement points 
Emission Standard  
(tCO2-e/MWh sent-out) 
 
Hazelwood 
 
Yallourn 
1.2 Mothballing 
$492m 
Mothballing 
$665.3m 
1.1 Mothballing 
$311.8m 
Mothballing 
480.8m 
1.0 Mothballing 
$131m 
Mothballing 
$295.6m 
 
All three disagreement values are higher for Yallourn than Hazelwood. This stems from a 
combination of Yallourn’s lower emission intensity and higher profit margin, despite it being 
offset partially by Hazelwood’s larger capacity. This acts as a negotiating tool for Yallourn to 
receive a higher offer from Hazelwood than vice versa. Technological and cost efficiencies will 
continually improve CCS in the coming years, increasing its viability for the disagreement 
outcomes. This is demonstrated with significant improvements in parasite loads shown in 
previous studies (Kolstad & Young, 2010) compared with that of Boundary Dam. Improved 
profitability of CCS will increase the disagreement point income as CCS is substituted for output 
reduction. This directly translates to reducing the likelihood of an agreement, as the available 
surplus to split shrinks, as MiCC (e) increases in the offer condition of expression (3). 
5.2 Agreement Outcomes 
For an agreement to be reached, the offer made to the retiring plant must be less than the payoff 
to the remaining plant from remaining in the market or from expression (3); Xi ≤ Mj (i exit). 
Table 5.7 shows the expected payoffs if the other was to exit (excluding payment Xi). 
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 Table 5.7 - Agreement Point Outcomes 
 
A Yallourn exit is expected to earn Hazelwood net income of $1.521bn over its scheduled life, 
whereas a Hazelwood exit is expected to net Yallourn $1.426bn – a difference of $95m. This 
does not take into account expected wholesale price rises in the NEM from the reduced 
overcapacity. Hazelwood is benefited by the uplift in capacity of its smaller plant Loy Yang B, 
which earns owners GDF Suez an additional $111.2m. Without the Loy Yang B effect, Yallourn 
would have the higher net income due to their cleaner production capability and higher profit 
margins. As a result, Hazelwood will be able to provide a larger surplus than Yallourn after 
accounting for the threat point values. From an emission perspective, the regulator prefers a 
Hazelwood exit which achieves an additional 5.8% or 1600kt of CO2 abatement annually from 
the base case, explained by Hazelwood’s larger capacity and emission intensity. 
5.3 Determining the Nash Bargaining Solution: 
Having calculated the expected utilities or incomes under agreement and disagreement scenarios, 
we now calculate outcome of the bargaining game to find the Nash Bargaining Solution 
(uHN,uYN) under each of the emission stringencies, to determine if an agreement can be reached 
and the expected payment required. 
5.3.1 No Regulatory Uncertainty 
Total decommissioning and rehabilitation costs are set to: DH =$433m and DY = $317.4m, and 
substituting into equations in (10): 
1) Government Threatens 1.2t CO2-e per MWh: 
Scenario: Hazelwood offers Yallourn ‘X’ payment (million $): 
Agreements Hazelwood Yallourn
Make-up 
Generation* Totals
Emissions 
Saving (%)
Yallourn Exit Capacity factor 77% EXIT
Generation sent-out (MWh) 10,792,320                  -                                 8,094,240      18,886,560               
Emissions (kt) 16,512                          -                                 8,031              24,543                        
E saved p.a. (kt) (1,501)                           12,887                          (8,031)             3,355                          12.0%
Life Income (NPV) 1,521,029,671$         1,521,029,671$       
Hazelwood Exit Capacity factor EXIT 77%
Generation sent-out (MWh) -                                 9,982,896                    8,903,664      18,886,560               
Emissions (kt) -                                 14,176                          8,767              22,943                        
E saved p.a. (kt) 15,011                          (1,289)                           (8,767)             4,955                          17.8%
Life Income (NPV) 1,425,942,266$          1,425,942,266$       
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UHN = 492 + ½ (1521 – (492 +665.3))  and UYN = 665.3 + ½ (1521 – (492 +665.3)) 
UHN = 673.85  and UYN = 847.15 = XY 
Condition not met: XY = $847.15m ≱ 665.3 + 317.4  
Scenario: Yallourn offers Hazelwood ‘X’ payment (million $): 
UHN = 492 + ½ (1425.9 – (492 +665.3))  and UYN = 665.3 + ½ (1425.9 – (492 +665.3)) 
UHN = 626.3 = XH and UYN = 799.6m 
Condition not met: XH = 626.3 ≱ 492 + 433 
Hazelwood’s offer to Yallourn is greater than Yallourn’s to Hazelwood and is the dominant 
offer. However the offer does not meet the condition: XY ≥ MYOR/CC(e) + DY. As a result Yallourn 
will reject Hazelwood’s offer and no agreement is reached. Yallourn’s offer to Hazelwood is also 
rejected for failing the condition. The upfront decommissioning and rehabilitation costs are 
expected to prevent an agreement. 
2) Government Threatens 1.1t CO2-e per MWh: 
Scenario: Hazelwood offers Yallourn ‘X’ payment (million $): 
UHN = 311.8 + ½ (1521 – (311.8 + 480.8))  and UYN = 480.8 + ½ (1521 – (311.8 + 480.8)) 
UHN = 676  and UYN = 845 = XY 
Condition met: XY = 845 ≥ 480.8 + 317.4 
Scenario: Yallourn offers Hazelwood ‘X’ payment (million $): 
UHN = 311.8 + ½ (1425.9 – (311.8 + 480.8))  and UYN = 480.8 + ½ (1425.9 – (311.8 + 480.8)) 
UHN = 628.45 = XH and UYN = 797.45 
Condition not met: XH = 628.45 ≱ 311.8 + 433 
Again Hazelwood’s offer is dominant to Yallourn’s due to its larger threat points, but this time 
the split surplus to provide Yallourn is expected to exceed DY by $46.8m. This is not the case for 
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Hazelwood who despite having a lower disagreement point than Yallourn, has a much larger 
decommissioning and rehabilitation cost. Therefore this is the least stringent emission standard 
that results in a plant exit for the regulator. Hazelwood’s utility increases by $2.15m as 
stringency increased from 1.2 to 1.1t CO2-e per MWh, in both scenarios, whereas Yallourn’s 
utility decreased by $2.15m in the same settings.  
3) Government Threatens 1.0t CO2-e per MWh: 
Scenario: Hazelwood offers Yallourn ‘X’ payment (million $): 
UHN = 131 + ½ (1521 – (131 + 295.6))  and UYN = 295.6 + ½ (1521 – (131 + 295.6)) 
UHN = 678.2  and UYN = 842.8 = XY 
Condition met: XY = 842.8 ≥ 295.6 + 317.4  
Scenario: Yallourn offers Hazelwood ‘X’ payment (million $): 
UHN = 131 + ½ (1425.9 – (131 + 295.6))  and UYN = 295.6 + ½ (1425.9 – (131 + 295.6)) 
UHN = 630.65 = XH and UYN = 795.25 
Condition met: XH = 630.65 ≥ 131 + 433 
Clearly, under the strictest emission standard the surplus again grows which comfortably covers 
the cost Di for both Hazelwood and Yallourn. Utility has again increased for Hazelwood by 
$2.2m and decreased for Yallourn by the same amount. The slight difference of $0.05m from the 
change in utility for each from 1.2t to 1.1t emission standard is attributed to rounding. Therefore, 
utility increases at a constant rate for Hazelwood and decreases at a constant rate for Yallourn as 
the stringency of the emission standards is incrementally increased. A higher stringency equates 
to a lower overall threat point value and a larger surplus, leading to a lower minimum acceptable 
payment for Yallourn. The surplus increases at a greater rate than the reduction in the minimum 
payment for Yallourn, as it does not take into account the Hazelwood’s portion of the surplus. 
Taking the case of no uncertainty and the assumption of P80 end-of-life costs, the optimal 
emission standard for the regulator to achieve a plant retirement is 1.1t CO2-e/MWh. The 
feasibility of the policy increases if a less stringent policy also achieves their objectives. As 
33 
 
previously discussed, this is due to the likelihood of a weaker policy being politically acceptable 
due to the lobbying power of the coal industry, as well as reducing the risk of a joint exit and 
price rises from supply shortages in Victoria (AEMO, 2014). The failure of the 1.2t EPS could 
be prevented by the government offering relatively minimal funding of $135.6m to cover the 
shortfall. Moreover, this is not expected exacerbate barriers to exit (Riesz & Noone, 2013, p 17). 
There is also a possibility that the 1.2t EPS could succeed due to the owners willing to accept 
less than the calculated offer, funding part of the decommissioning and rehabilitation costs 
themselves. 
Although an agreement is theoretically achieved, the large offer to be paid may lead to concern 
that the plant will be unable to pay such a large amount upfront. The expected offers equate to 
almost 5 years of Hazelwood and Yallourn profit following the exit of the other plant. One way 
to bypass this issue could be by the two firms enter into a contract specifying a payment schedule 
for Hazelwood as they earn income, suggested in Nelson et al. (2015; p.39). However, there is 
the possibility that both plants may choose to exit the market due to unwillingness or inability to 
make the large payment. 
As the highest emitting plant and oldest in the NEM, Hazelwood may instead prefer to exit the 
market, unwilling or unable to offer $845m to Yallourn. Instead, an acceptable offer to 
Hazelwood from Yallourn is expected to be $217m less and therefore more manageable. 
Furthermore, a Hazelwood exit is preferable to the regulator, achieving an additional 5.8% or 
1600kt of CO2 abatement annually. However if Yallourn suspects Hazelwood’s willingness to 
exit, they may reduce their offer which may risk a breakdown in negotiations and the agreement. 
The period allowed to reach an agreement must allow for healthy and efficient negotiation, but 
be relatively short to avoid delaying regulation and undermining of threat credibility (Nelson et 
al., 2015). 
5.3.2 Uncertainty of Threat Point Credibility  
So far, we have dealt with plant expectations that the plant’s threat will be introduced with 100% 
certainty. Recent volatility in the Australian political landscape may cause the plants to lower 
their expectations on the credibility of the regulatory threat which is now introduced.  
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We now let 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and take the agreement outcomes from the previous case of no uncertainty 
to substitute into equation (11). 
Agreement from 1.1t CO2-e per MWh 
ƒ(X,p) = [(1521 – X) – (311.8p + (1 – p) 1082)] [(X – (480.8p + (1 – p) 1122.5)]  (13) 
From equation (11), the minimum expected acceptable payoff for Yallourn for an agreement will 
be XY = 798.2. Substituting the values into equation (13): 
ƒ(p) = [(1521 – 798.2) – (311.8p + (1 – p) 1082)] [798.2 – (480.8p + (1 – p) 1122.5)] 
ƒ(p) = (722.8 – 311.8p – 1082 + 1082p) (798.2 – 480.8p – 1122.5 + 1122.5p) 
ƒ(p) = (770.2p – 359.2) (641.7p – 324.3) 
ƒ(p) = 494237.34p2 – 480274.5p + 116488.56 
ƒ(p) = 988474.68p – 480274.5 
let ƒ’(p) = 0 and solve for p: 
p = 0.4859 = 48.6% 
ƒ”(p) > 0 and therefore is a local minimum 
Under a 1.1 tCO2-e per MWh EPS, the point where p = 0.4859 is where Hazelwood’s offer to 
Yallourn exactly equals Yallourn’s minimum acceptable payment of $798.2m covering their 
disagreement value from mothballing capacity and upfront decommissioning and rehabilitation 
costs from exiting. If plant owners have an expectation of ≲ 49% that the policy will have no 
effect on BAU level income, they are expected to reject the offer. The emission standard of 1.1t 
of CO2-e per MWh cannot be expected by the plant owners to have a credibility of ≲ 49% if the 
policy is to succeed in achieving a plant exit.  
Agreement from 1.0t CO2-e per MWh 
ƒ(X,p) = [(1521 – X) – (131 p + (1 – p) 1082.0)] [X – (295.6p + (1 – p) 1122.5)]  (14) 
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From expression (11), the minimum acceptable payoff for Yallourn to form an agreement will be 
XY = 613. Substituting into equation (14): 
ƒ(p) = [(1521 – 613) – (131p + (1 – p) 1082)] [613 – (295.6p + (1 – p) 1122.5)] 
ƒ(p) = (908 – 131p – 1082 + 1082p) (613 – 295.6p – 1122.5 + 1122.5p) 
ƒ(p) = (951p – 174) (826.9p – 509.5) 
ƒ(p) = 786381.9p2 – 628415.1p + 88653 
ƒ’(p) = 1572763.8p – 628415.1 
let ƒ’(p) = 0 and solve for p: 
p = 0.3996 = 40% 
ƒ”(p) > 0 and therefore is a local minimum 
If the stringency is increased to a 1.0t CO2-e per MWh threat, the expected credibility required 
for the policy decreases to 40%. A more stringent EPS results in less credibility required to 
facilitate an agreement as expected, although both stringencies allow a low level of regulatory 
threat credibility in plant owner expectations. Furthermore, a reasonable person may expect that 
there is a low likelihood of this regulation being weakened by the more regulatory tough 
opposition party if they were to come to power. Despite ongoing instability in the direction of 
emissions policy, this provides the regulator with a considerable buffer to help assure of an 
agreement and optimal emission reductions over disagreement outcomes. 
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6. Conclusion 
Cooperative bargaining under a credible threat of a 1.1t CO2-e per MWh emissions standard, 
theoretically achieves an exit of the highly-emitting Yallourn power plant to reduce overcapacity 
concerns. This is despite factoring in very conservative estimates of decommissioning and 
rehabilitation costs. An agreement is optimal for the regulator, resulting in over 60% more 
emission reductions than when both plants disagree and face the regulation. It translates to 
estimated cumulative emission savings of almost 47Mt of CO2 over the next 15 years (ceteris 
paribus), and reducing the expected gap for meeting Australia’s 2030 emissions target with 
current policy by 4.1% (Energetics, 2016). 
Due to cost inefficiencies of CCS, the power plants find that mothballing capacity is more 
profitable for abating under disagreement. As this technology improves and expected installation 
costs reduce, the coal plants are expected to change their preference in favour of CCS, increasing 
the disagreement values and reducing the potential surplus and likelihood of an agreement 
reached. 
A less-stringent, but more politically acceptable target of 1.2t CO2-e per MWh is expected to fail, 
primarily due to these end-of-life costs that the plants are unable to account for in their offers. 
Implementing this standard provides less risk of both plants choosing to exit, pressuring energy 
security and prices in Victoria (AEMO, 2014). Additional government assistance of $136m to 
help cover these costs could make it optimal for Yallourn to exit under a 1.2t standard. This 
equates to the government purchasing reductions at $2.69 per tonne of CO2 – far cheaper than 
abatement recently purchased through it’s ERF20 (CER, 2017a). 
Introducing regulatory uncertainty into the decision making process for plant owners, resulted in 
a threshold level of almost 51% of uncertainty where negotiations failed under the threat of a 1.1t 
EPS. This provides a sizeable buffer to accommodate the lack of confidence in the regulatory 
threat as may be expected in the current political environment (Nelson et al., 2015).  
                                                          
20 The fifth ERF auction (April 2017) resulted in an average cost to the government of $11.82 per tonne of CO2 
abated. 
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7. Further Research 
Uncertain elements which can impact the ability for an optimal agreement being reached include 
changes in expectations of the discount rate, wholesale price rises, cost effectiveness of CCS 
increasing threat points, and the ability of the generators to fund exit payments. Conservative 
estimates have been taken in this research to improve the validity of the findings. The impact 
upon agreement payoffs vs disagreement payoffs could be investigated with a sensitivity 
analysis. However in determining the surplus, the impact upon agreement values could 
reasonably be expected to be greater than on the lower disagreement point values. Therefore a 
reduction in net income from a change in a parameter is expected to reduce the potential surplus 
available and likelihood of reaching an agreement, and vice versa for an increase. 
Decommissioning and rehabilitation costs could be more accurately defined with outcomes from 
an expected national audit of these costs (Senate Committee, 2017). The level at which these 
costs need to be incorporated into the offer payment for it to be accepted could be further 
investigated. Detailed modelling is required on potential price rises including; agreement 
outcomes altering the merit order,21 oversupply reductions, inducing an earlier retirement than 
otherwise would have happened without intervention to another plant (Jotzo & Mazouz, 2015; 
Nelson et al., 2015), levels of cost pass-through from wholesale to retail prices to ensure 
electricity remains affordable (Jotzo & Mazouz, 2015). Caldecott et al. (2015) assumes a 
‘conservative’ discount rate of 9% for public funding to close SCPCs, suggesting this could be 
much higher.  
Mandating a certain level of CCS could be investigated for the regulator to achieve higher 
emission savings than mothballing if disagreement eventuates. This would cause the 
disagreement payoffs to decrease and increase the likelihood of an agreement. However, cost and 
performance inefficiencies of CCS would likely force electricity prices much higher as the 
regulator doesn’t allow for bargaining to decide on the cheapest abatement method, removing the 
option value for the generators to implement CCS when it is efficient to do so. Furthermore, it 
increases the risk of a joint retirement with neither choosing to face the regulation, pressuring 
supply and prices. 
                                                          
21 The removal of a baseload generator will affect the marginal cost structure of the merit order. 
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Appendix A – Base Case Scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wholesale E(p) ($/MWh) Fuel Costs ($/GJ) Fuel Costs ($/MWh) VOM ($) FOM ($) Average costs ($/MWh) Margins ($) Electricity sent-out @ 70% capacity (MWh) NPAT @21% Emissions (kt) BAU
FY E(Pw) H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y Total H Y H Y Total
2016 41.02 0.09 0.1 0.4 1.03 1.07 3.79 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 26.92 26.08 23.05 14.10 14.94 17.96 9811200 9075360 18886560 109,273,363.05$     107,094,497.45$     15011 12887 27898
2017 41.81 0.09 0.1 0.4 1.03 1.07 3.79 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 26.92 26.08 23.05 14.89 15.73 18.75 9811200 9075360 18886560 115,396,532.97$     112,758,429.62$     15011 12887 27898
2018 42.60 0.09 0.11 0.41 1.03 1.18 3.88 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 26.92 26.18 23.15 15.68 16.41 19.45 9811200 9075360 18886560 121,519,702.89$     117,653,543.64$     15011 12887 27898
2019 43.39 0.1 0.11 0.41 1.15 1.18 3.88 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 27.03 26.18 23.15 16.35 17.20 20.24 9811200 9075360 18886560 126,755,048.41$     123,317,475.82$     15011 12887 27898
2020 44.18 0.1 0.11 0.42 1.15 1.18 3.98 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 27.03 26.18 23.24 17.14 17.99 20.93 9811200 9075360 18886560 132,878,218.33$     128,981,407.99$     15011 12887 27898
2021 44.97 0.1 0.11 0.42 1.15 1.18 3.98 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 27.03 26.18 23.24 17.93 18.78 21.72 9811200 9075360 18886560 139,001,388.25$     134,645,340.17$     15011 12887 27898
2022 45.76 0.1 0.11 0.42 1.15 1.18 3.98 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 27.03 26.18 23.24 18.72 19.57 22.51 9811200 9075360 18886560 145,124,558.17$     140,309,272.35$     15011 12887 27898
2023 46.55 0.1 0.12 0.43 1.15 1.29 4.07 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 27.03 26.29 23.34 19.51 20.25 23.21 9811200 9075360 18886560 151,247,728.09$     145,204,386.36$     15011 12887 27898
2024 47.34 0.11 0.12 0.43 1.26 1.29 4.07 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 27.15 26.29 23.34 20.19 21.04 24.00 9811200 9075360 18886560 156,483,073.60$     150,868,318.54$     15011 12887 27898
2025 48.13 0.11 0.12 0.44 1.26 1.29 4.17 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 27.15 26.29 23.43 20.98 21.83 24.69 9811200 9075360 18886560 162,606,243.52$     156,532,250.72$     15011 12887 27898
2026 48.92 0.11 0.12 0.44 1.26 1.29 4.17 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 27.15 26.29 23.43 21.77 22.62 25.48 9811200 9075360 18886560 168,729,413.44$     162,196,182.89$     15011 12887 27898
2027 49.71 0.11 0.13 0.45 1.26 1.39 4.26 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 27.15 26.40 23.53 22.56 23.31 26.18 9811200 9075360 18886560 174,852,583.36$     167,091,296.91$     15011 12887 27898
2028 50.50 0.12 0.13 0.45 1.37 1.39 4.26 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 27.26 26.40 23.53 23.23 24.10 26.97 9811200 9075360 18886560 180,087,928.87$     172,755,229.09$     15011 12887 27898
2029 51.29 0.12 0.13 0.45 1.37 1.39 4.26 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 27.26 26.40 23.53 24.02 24.89 27.76 9811200 9075360 18886560 186,211,098.79$     178,419,161.26$     15011 12887 27898
2030 52.08 0.12 0.13 0.46 1.37 1.39 4.36 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 27.26 26.40 23.62 24.81 25.68 28.45 9811200 9075360 18886560 192,334,268.71$     184,083,093.44$     15011 12887 27898
2031 52.87 0.12 0.14 0.46 1.37 1.50 4.36 1 1 1 24.89 24.01 18.26 27.26 26.51 23.62 25.60 26.36 29.24 9811200 9075360 18886560 (234,542,561.37)$   188,978,207.46$     15011 12887 27898
2032 53.66 0.14 1.50 1 24.01 26.51 27.15 9075360 9075360 -$                            (122,757,860.37)$   12887 12887
Operational Life Totals 156,979,200  154,281,120 311,260,320  $1,082,030,560.92 1,122,468,538.99$ 240,178      219,079  459,257    
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Appendix B – Agreement Scenario 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 @80% capacity  @80% capacity
Wholesale E(p) ($/MWh) Fuel Costs ($/GJ) Fuel Costs ($/MWh) VOM ($) FOM ($) @ 80% Average costs ($/MWh) Margins ($) Electricity sent-out @ 80% capacity (MWh) NPAT (Tax @ 21%) of the other exiting Emissions (kt) from Y Exit Emissions (kt) from H exit
FY E(Pw) H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B 10% increase H Y LY B @ 10% for H H (BAU) Make-up Total Y (BAU) Make-up Total
2016 41.015 0.09 0.1 0.4 1.18 1.31 5.24 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 23.95 23.31 22.22 17.06 17.70 18.80 10792320 9982896 735840 145,466,941.98$      139,601,425.38$       10,926,894.31$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2017 41.805 0.09 0.1 0.4 1.18 1.31 5.24 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 23.95 23.31 22.22 17.85 18.49 19.59 10792320 9982896 735840 152,202,428.90$      145,831,750.78$       11,386,132.05$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2018 42.595 0.09 0.11 0.41 1.18 1.44 5.37 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 23.95 23.44 22.35 18.64 19.15 20.25 10792320 9982896 735840 158,937,915.81$      151,029,663.22$       11,769,270.56$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2019 43.385 0.1 0.11 0.41 1.31 1.44 5.37 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 24.08 23.44 22.35 19.30 19.94 21.04 10792320 9982896 735840 164,557,280.61$      157,259,988.61$       12,228,508.30$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2020 44.175 0.1 0.11 0.42 1.31 1.44 5.50 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 24.08 23.44 22.48 20.09 20.73 21.70 10792320 9982896 735840 171,292,767.52$      163,490,314.00$       12,611,646.81$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2021 44.965 0.1 0.11 0.42 1.31 1.44 5.50 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 24.08 23.44 22.48 20.88 21.52 22.49 10792320 9982896 735840 178,028,254.43$      169,720,639.40$       13,070,884.56$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2022 45.755 0.1 0.11 0.42 1.31 1.44 5.50 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 24.08 23.44 22.48 21.67 22.31 23.28 10792320 9982896 735840 184,763,741.34$      175,950,964.79$       13,530,122.30$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2023 46.545 0.1 0.12 0.43 1.31 1.57 5.63 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 24.08 23.58 22.61 22.46 22.97 23.93 10792320 9982896 735840 191,499,228.26$      181,148,877.23$       13,913,260.81$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2024 47.335 0.11 0.12 0.43 1.44 1.57 5.63 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 24.22 23.58 22.61 23.12 23.76 24.72 10792320 9982896 735840 197,118,593.06$      187,379,202.62$       14,372,498.55$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2025 48.125 0.11 0.12 0.44 1.44 1.57 5.76 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 24.22 23.58 22.74 23.91 24.55 25.38 10792320 9982896 735840 203,854,079.97$      193,609,528.02$       14,755,637.06$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2026 48.915 0.11 0.12 0.44 1.44 1.57 5.76 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 24.22 23.58 22.74 24.70 25.34 26.17 10792320 9982896 735840 210,589,566.88$      199,839,853.41$       15,214,874.81$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2027 49.705 0.11 0.13 0.45 1.44 1.70 5.89 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 24.22 23.71 22.87 25.49 26.00 26.83 10792320 9982896 735840 217,325,053.79$      205,037,765.85$       15,598,013.32$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2028 50.495 0.12 0.13 0.45 1.57 1.70 5.89 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 24.35 23.71 22.87 26.15 26.79 27.62 10792320 9982896 735840 222,944,418.59$      211,268,091.24$       16,057,251.06$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2029 51.285 0.12 0.13 0.45 1.57 1.70 5.89 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 24.35 23.71 22.87 26.94 27.58 28.41 10792320 9982896 735840 229,679,905.50$      217,498,416.64$       16,516,488.81$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2030 52.075 0.12 0.13 0.46 1.57 1.70 6.02 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 24.35 23.71 23.00 27.73 28.37 29.07 10792320 9982896 735840 236,415,392.42$      223,728,742.03$       16,899,627.31$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2031 52.865 0.12 0.14 0.46 1.57 1.83 6.02 1 1 1 21.78 21.00 15.98 24.35 23.84 23.00 28.52 29.03 29.86 10792320 9982896 735840 (189,849,120.67)$     228,926,654.47$       17,358,865.06$     15011 9532 24543 12887 10056 22943
2032 53.655 0.14 1.83 1 21.00 23.84 29.82 9982896 (82,243,020.14)$       12887 10056 22943
Operational Life Totals 172,677,120   169,709,232             11,773,440            $1,409,811,880 $1,425,942,266 $111,217,790.72 240178 152510 392688 219079 170953 390032
NPV (H + LY B - Dh) NPV (Y - Dy)
$1,521,029,671 $1,425,942,266
Y exit H exit
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Appendix C – Disagreement Scenarios: Output Reduction 
1. Strict Standard: 1.0 tCO2-e/MWh 
 
 
2. Medium Standard: 1.1 tCO2-e/MWh 
 
 
Forecast Electricity prices Fuel Costs $/GJ Fuel Costs $/MWh VOM FOM Average costs $/MWh Margins Hazelwood NPAT (Tax @ 21%) Yallourn NPAT (Tax @ 21%) Emissions (kt) BAU Emissions 1t-e CO2 std (kt) Emissions Saved (kt)
FY E(Pw) H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B Gen (MWh) Profit  (NPV) Lost profit (NPV) Cost/MWh Gen (MWh) Profit (NPV) Lost profit (cost) Cost/MWh Hazelwood Yallourn HazelwoodYallourn Make-up Hazelwood Yallourn Total
2016 41.015 0.09 0.1 0.4 0.67 0.76 3.79 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.75 37.09 23.05 1.27 3.92 17.96 6412549 6,412,741.31$         102,860,621.74$ 16.04$               6391099 19,801,704.40$     87,292,793.05$     13.66$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2017 41.805 0.09 0.1 0.4 0.67 0.76 3.79 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.75 37.09 23.05 2.06 4.71 18.75 6412549 10,414,813.15$       104,981,719.82$ 16.37$               6391099 23,790,389.03$     88,968,040.60$     13.92$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2018 42.595 0.09 0.11 0.41 0.67 0.83 3.88 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.75 37.17 23.15 2.85 5.43 19.45 6412549 14,416,885.00$       107,102,817.90$ 16.70$               6391099 27,397,791.10$     90,255,752.54$     14.12$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2019 43.385 0.1 0.11 0.41 0.75 0.83 3.88 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.82 37.17 23.15 3.56 6.22 20.24 6412549 18,039,690.57$       108,715,357.83$ 16.95$               6391099 31,386,475.73$     91,931,000.09$     14.38$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2020 44.175 0.1 0.11 0.42 0.75 0.83 3.98 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.82 37.17 23.24 4.35 7.01 20.93 6412549 22,041,762.42$       110,836,455.91$ 17.28$               6391099 35,375,160.36$     93,606,247.63$     14.65$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2021 44.965 0.1 0.11 0.42 0.75 0.83 3.98 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.82 37.17 23.24 5.14 7.80 21.72 6412549 26,043,834.26$       112,957,553.99$ 17.62$               6391099 39,363,844.99$     95,281,495.18$     14.91$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2022 45.755 0.1 0.11 0.42 0.75 0.83 3.98 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.82 37.17 23.24 5.93 8.59 22.51 6412549 30,045,906.10$       115,078,652.07$ 17.95$               6391099 43,352,529.62$     96,956,742.72$     15.17$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2023 46.545 0.1 0.12 0.43 0.75 0.91 4.07 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.82 37.24 23.34 6.72 9.30 23.21 6412549 34,047,977.95$       117,199,750.14$ 18.28$               6391099 46,959,931.69$     98,244,454.67$     15.37$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2024 47.335 0.11 0.12 0.43 0.82 0.91 4.07 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.90 37.24 23.34 7.44 10.09 24.00 6412549 37,670,783.52$       118,812,290.08$ 18.53$               6391099 50,948,616.32$     99,919,702.22$     15.63$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2025 48.125 0.11 0.12 0.44 0.82 0.91 4.17 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.90 37.24 23.43 8.23 10.88 24.69 6412549 41,672,855.36$       120,933,388.16$ 18.86$               6391099 54,937,300.95$     101,594,949.76$  15.90$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2026 48.915 0.11 0.12 0.44 0.82 0.91 4.17 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.90 37.24 23.43 9.02 11.67 25.48 6412549 45,674,927.21$       123,054,486.23$ 19.19$               6391099 58,925,985.58$     103,270,197.31$  16.16$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2027 49.705 0.11 0.13 0.45 0.82 0.98 4.26 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.90 37.32 23.53 9.81 12.39 26.18 6412549 49,676,999.05$       125,175,584.31$ 19.52$               6391099 62,533,387.65$     104,557,909.26$  16.36$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2028 50.495 0.12 0.13 0.45 0.90 0.98 4.26 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.97 37.32 23.53 10.52 13.18 26.97 6412549 53,299,804.62$       126,788,124.25$ 19.77$               6391099 66,522,072.28$     106,233,156.80$  16.62$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2029 51.285 0.12 0.13 0.45 0.90 0.98 4.26 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.97 37.32 23.53 11.31 13.97 27.76 6412549 57,301,876.47$       128,909,222.33$ 20.10$               6391099 70,510,756.92$     107,908,404.35$  16.88$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2030 52.075 0.12 0.13 0.46 0.90 0.98 4.36 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.97 37.32 23.62 12.10 14.76 28.45 6412549 61,303,948.31$       131,030,320.40$ 20.43$               6391099 74,499,441.55$     109,583,651.89$  17.15$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2031 52.865 0.12 0.14 0.46 0.90 1.06 4.36 1 1 1 38.08 35.34 18.26 39.97 37.40 23.62 12.89 15.47 29.24 6412549 (367,693,979.85)$   133,151,418.48$ 20.76$               6391099 78,106,843.62$     110,871,363.84$  17.35$      15011 12887 9811 9075 6200 5200 3812 2811
2032 53.655 0.14 1.06 1 35.34 37.40 16.26 6391099 (235,304,471.75)$ 112,546,611.39$  17.61$      12887 9075 3812
Operational Life Totals 102,600,784   $131,001,918.20 $951,028,642.72 108,648,676 $295,611,533.54 $826,857,005.45 240,178     219,079    156,979 154,281   99,207       83,199          64,798        44,978    
Forecast Electricity prices Fuel Costs $/GJ Fuel Costs $/MWh VOM FOM Average costs $/MWh Margins Hazelwood Yallourn NPAT (Tax @ 21%) Emissions (kt) BAU Emissions with 1.1 e std (kt) Emissions Saved (kt)
FY E(Pw) H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B Gen (MWh) Profit Lost profit (cost) Cost/MWh Gen (MWh) Profit Lost profit (cost) Cost/MWh Hazelwood Yallourn HazelwoodYallourn Make-up Hazelwood Yallourn Total
2016 41.015 0.09 0.1 0.4 0.74 0.83 3.79 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.36 33.96 23.05 4.66 7.06 17.96 7053804 25,967,181.84$       83,306,181.22$   11.81$               7030208 39,204,456.02$     67,890,041.43$     9.66$        15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2017 41.805 0.09 0.1 0.4 0.74 0.83 3.79 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.36 33.96 23.05 5.45 7.85 18.75 7053804 30,369,460.86$       85,027,072.11$   12.05$               7030208 43,592,009.11$     69,166,420.51$     9.84$        15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2018 42.595 0.09 0.11 0.41 0.74 0.91 3.88 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.36 34.04 23.15 6.24 8.56 19.45 7053804 34,771,739.89$       86,747,963.00$   12.30$               7030208 47,518,210.31$     70,135,333.33$     9.98$        15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2019 43.385 0.1 0.11 0.41 0.82 0.91 3.88 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.44 34.04 23.15 6.95 9.35 20.24 7053804 38,715,106.73$       88,039,941.67$   12.48$               7030208 51,905,763.40$     71,411,712.42$     10.16$      15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2020 44.175 0.1 0.11 0.42 0.82 0.91 3.98 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.44 34.04 23.24 7.74 10.14 20.93 7053804 43,117,385.76$       89,760,832.56$   12.73$               7030208 56,293,316.50$     72,688,091.50$     10.34$      15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2021 44.965 0.1 0.11 0.42 0.82 0.91 3.98 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.44 34.04 23.24 8.53 10.93 21.72 7053804 47,519,664.79$       91,481,723.46$   12.97$               7030208 60,680,869.59$     73,964,470.58$     10.52$      15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2022 45.755 0.1 0.11 0.42 0.82 0.91 3.98 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.44 34.04 23.24 9.32 11.72 22.51 7053804 51,921,943.82$       93,202,614.35$   13.21$               7030208 65,068,422.68$     75,240,849.66$     10.70$      15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2023 46.545 0.1 0.12 0.43 0.82 1.00 4.07 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.44 34.12 23.34 10.11 12.42 23.21 7053804 56,324,222.84$       94,923,505.24$   13.46$               7030208 68,994,623.88$     76,209,762.49$     10.84$      15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2024 47.335 0.11 0.12 0.43 0.91 1.00 4.07 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.52 34.12 23.34 10.82 13.21 24.00 7053804 60,267,589.69$       96,215,483.91$   13.64$               7030208 73,382,176.97$     77,486,141.57$     11.02$      15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2025 48.125 0.11 0.12 0.44 0.91 1.00 4.17 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.52 34.12 23.43 11.61 14.00 24.69 7053804 64,669,868.72$       97,936,374.80$   13.88$               7030208 77,769,730.07$     78,762,520.65$     11.20$      15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2026 48.915 0.11 0.12 0.44 0.91 1.00 4.17 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.52 34.12 23.43 12.40 14.79 25.48 7053804 69,072,147.74$       99,657,265.70$   14.13$               7030208 82,157,283.16$     80,038,899.73$     11.38$      15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2027 49.705 0.11 0.13 0.45 0.91 1.08 4.26 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.52 34.21 23.53 13.19 15.50 26.18 7053804 73,474,426.77$       101,378,156.59$ 14.37$               7030208 86,083,484.36$     81,007,812.56$     11.52$      15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2028 50.495 0.12 0.13 0.45 0.99 1.08 4.26 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.60 34.21 23.53 13.89 16.29 26.97 7053804 77,417,793.61$       102,670,135.26$ 14.56$               7030208 90,471,037.45$     82,284,191.64$     11.70$      15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2029 51.285 0.12 0.13 0.45 0.99 1.08 4.26 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.60 34.21 23.53 14.68 17.08 27.76 7053804 81,820,072.64$       104,391,026.15$ 14.80$               7030208 94,858,590.54$     83,560,570.72$     11.89$      15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2030 52.075 0.12 0.13 0.46 0.99 1.08 4.36 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.60 34.21 23.62 15.47 17.87 28.45 7053804 86,222,351.67$       106,111,917.04$ 15.04$               7030208 99,246,143.64$     84,836,949.80$     12.07$      15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2031 52.865 0.12 0.14 0.46 0.99 1.16 4.36 1 1 1 34.61 32.13 18.26 36.60 34.29 23.62 16.26 18.58 29.24 7053804 (342,375,369.30)$   107,832,807.94$ 15.29$               7030208 103,172,344.83$  85,805,862.63$     12.21$      15011 12887 10792 9983 5035 4219 2904 2088
2032 53.655 0.14 1.16 1 32.13 34.29 19.37 7030208 (209,840,102.07)$ 87,082,241.71$     12.39$      12887 9983 2904
Operational Life Totals 112,860,863   $311,819,737.84 $770,210,823.08 119,513,544 $480,834,101.64 $641,634,437.35 240,178     219,079    172,677 169,709   80,565       67,501          49,370        33,402    
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3. Weak Standard: 1.2 tCO2-e/MWh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forecast Electricity prices Fuel Costs $/GJ Fuel Costs $/MWh VOM FOM Average costs $/MWh Margins Hazelwood Yallourn NPAT (Tax @ 21%) Emissions (kt) BAU Emissions (kt) with 1.2 e std Emissions Saved (kt)
FY E(Pw) H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B H Y LY B Generation (MWh)Profit Lost profit (cost) Cost/MWh Gerneration (MWh)Profit Lost profit (cost) Cost/MWh Hazelwood Yallourn HazelwoodYallourn Make-up Hazelwood Yallourn Total
2016 41.015 0.09 0.1 0.4 0.81 0.91 3.79 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.54 31.35 23.05 7.48 9.66 17.96 7695059 45,453,354.43$       63,820,008.62$   8.29$                  7669318 58,530,951.13$     48,563,546.32$     6.33$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2017 41.805 0.09 0.1 0.4 0.81 0.91 3.79 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.54 31.35 23.05 8.27 10.45 18.75 7695059 50,255,840.65$       65,140,692.33$   8.47$                  7669318 63,317,372.69$     49,441,056.94$     6.45$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2018 42.595 0.09 0.11 0.41 0.81 1.00 3.88 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.54 31.45 23.15 9.06 11.15 19.45 7695059 55,058,326.86$       66,461,376.04$   8.64$                  7669318 67,554,747.35$     50,098,796.29$     6.53$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2019 43.385 0.1 0.11 0.41 0.90 1.00 3.88 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.63 31.45 23.15 9.76 11.94 20.24 7695059 59,314,669.64$       67,440,378.76$   8.76$                  7669318 72,341,168.91$     50,976,306.91$     6.65$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2020 44.175 0.1 0.11 0.42 0.90 1.00 3.98 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.63 31.45 23.24 10.55 12.73 20.93 7695059 64,117,155.86$       68,761,062.47$   8.94$                  7669318 77,127,590.47$     51,853,817.53$     6.76$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2021 44.965 0.1 0.11 0.42 0.90 1.00 3.98 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.63 31.45 23.24 11.34 13.52 21.72 7695059 68,919,642.07$       70,081,746.18$   9.11$                  7669318 81,914,012.03$     52,731,328.14$     6.88$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2022 45.755 0.1 0.11 0.42 0.90 1.00 3.98 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.63 31.45 23.24 12.13 14.31 22.51 7695059 73,722,128.28$       71,402,429.89$   9.28$                  7669318 86,700,433.58$     53,608,838.76$     6.99$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2023 46.545 0.1 0.12 0.43 0.90 1.09 4.07 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.63 31.54 23.34 12.92 15.01 23.21 7695059 78,524,614.49$       72,723,113.60$   9.45$                  7669318 90,937,808.25$     54,266,578.11$     7.08$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2024 47.335 0.11 0.12 0.43 0.99 1.09 4.07 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.72 31.54 23.34 13.62 15.80 24.00 7695059 82,780,957.28$       73,702,116.32$   9.58$                  7669318 95,724,229.81$     55,144,088.73$     7.19$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2025 48.125 0.11 0.12 0.44 0.99 1.09 4.17 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.72 31.54 23.43 14.41 16.59 24.69 7695059 87,583,443.49$       75,022,800.03$   9.75$                  7669318 100,510,651.37$  56,021,599.35$     7.30$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2026 48.915 0.11 0.12 0.44 0.99 1.09 4.17 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.72 31.54 23.43 15.20 17.38 25.48 7695059 92,385,929.70$       76,343,483.74$   9.92$                  7669318 105,297,072.92$  56,899,109.97$     7.42$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2027 49.705 0.11 0.13 0.45 0.99 1.18 4.26 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.72 31.63 23.53 15.99 18.08 26.18 7695059 97,188,415.91$       77,664,167.45$   10.09$               7669318 109,534,447.59$  57,556,849.32$     7.50$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2028 50.495 0.12 0.13 0.45 1.08 1.18 4.26 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.81 31.63 23.53 16.69 18.87 26.97 7695059 101,444,758.70$    78,643,170.18$   10.22$               7669318 114,320,869.15$  58,434,359.94$     7.62$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2029 51.285 0.12 0.13 0.45 1.08 1.18 4.26 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.81 31.63 23.53 17.48 19.66 27.76 7695059 106,247,244.91$    79,963,853.88$   10.39$               7669318 119,107,290.71$  59,311,870.56$     7.73$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2030 52.075 0.12 0.13 0.46 1.08 1.18 4.36 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.81 31.63 23.62 18.27 20.45 28.45 7695059 111,049,731.12$    81,284,537.59$   10.56$               7669318 123,893,712.26$  60,189,381.18$     7.85$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2031 52.865 0.12 0.14 0.46 1.08 1.27 4.36 1 1 1 31.73 29.45 18.26 33.81 31.72 23.62 19.06 21.15 29.24 7695059 (317,147,782.67)$   82,605,221.30$   10.73$               7669318 128,131,086.93$  60,847,120.53$     7.93$        15011 12887 11773 10890 3870 3238 1997 1364
2032 53.655 0.14 1.27 1 29.45 31.72 21.94 7669318 (184,482,491.51)$ 61,724,631.15$     8.05$        12887 10890 1997
Operational Life Totals 123,120,941   $491,996,416.52 $590,034,144.41 130,378,411 $665,309,715.12 $457,158,823.88 240,178     219,079    188,375 185,137   61,923       51,803          33,942        21,825    
50 
 
Appendix D – Disagreement Scenarios: Carbon Capture and Storage 
1. Installed units: H =200MW/ Y=350MW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forecast Electricity prices Fuel Costs $/GJ Fuel Costs $/MWh VOM $/MWh FOM $/MWh VOM (CCS) $/MWhFOM (CCS) $/MWhAverage costs $/MWh Margins $/MWh Electricity Sent-Out MWh NPAT (Tax @ 21%) Emissions (kt) (no CCS) Emissions (kt) Emissions Saved (kt)
FY E(Pw) H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y Total
2016 41.015 0.09 0.1 1.03 1.07 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.31 28.71 12.71 12.30 9688560 8860740 (1,109,749,480.60)$  (2,026,127,247.27)$   15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2017 41.805 0.09 0.1 1.03 1.07 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.31 28.71 13.50 13.09 9688560 8860740 103,298,817.01$       91,655,658.37$          15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2018 42.595 0.09 0.11 1.03 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.31 28.82 14.29 13.78 9688560 8860740 109,345,447.31$       96,435,009.56$          15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2019 43.385 0.1 0.11 1.15 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.42 28.82 14.96 14.57 9688560 8860740 114,515,351.00$       101,964,997.40$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2020 44.175 0.1 0.11 1.15 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.42 28.82 15.75 15.36 9688560 8860740 120,561,981.30$       107,494,985.23$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2021 44.965 0.1 0.11 1.15 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.42 28.82 16.54 16.15 9688560 8860740 126,608,611.59$       113,024,973.06$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2022 45.755 0.1 0.11 1.15 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.42 28.82 17.33 16.94 9688560 8860740 132,655,241.89$       118,554,960.90$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2023 46.545 0.1 0.12 1.15 1.29 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.42 28.93 18.12 17.62 9688560 8860740 138,701,872.19$       123,334,312.09$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2024 47.335 0.11 0.12 1.26 1.29 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.54 28.93 18.80 18.41 9688560 8860740 143,871,775.88$       128,864,299.92$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2025 48.125 0.11 0.12 1.26 1.29 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.54 28.93 19.59 19.20 9688560 8860740 149,918,406.18$       134,394,287.75$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2026 48.915 0.11 0.12 1.26 1.29 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.54 28.93 20.38 19.99 9688560 8860740 155,965,036.47$       139,924,275.59$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2027 49.705 0.11 0.13 1.26 1.39 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.54 29.03 21.17 20.67 9688560 8860740 162,011,666.77$       144,703,626.78$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2028 50.495 0.12 0.13 1.37 1.39 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.65 29.03 21.84 21.46 9688560 8860740 167,181,570.46$       150,233,614.61$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2029 51.285 0.12 0.13 1.37 1.39 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.65 29.03 22.63 22.25 9688560 8860740 173,228,200.76$       155,763,602.44$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2030 52.075 0.12 0.13 1.37 1.39 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.65 29.03 23.42 23.04 9688560 8860740 179,274,831.05$       161,293,590.28$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2031 52.865 0.12 0.14 1.37 1.50 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.65 29.14 24.21 23.72 9688560 8860740 185,321,461.35$       166,072,941.46$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2032 53.655 0.12 0.14 1.37 1.50 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.65 29.14 25.00 24.51 9688560 8860740 191,368,091.65$       171,602,929.30$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2033 54.445 0.13 0.14 1.49 1.50 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.77 29.14 25.68 25.30 9688560 8860740 196,537,995.34$       177,132,917.13$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2034 55.235 0.13 0.14 1.49 1.50 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.77 29.14 26.47 26.09 9688560 8860740 202,584,625.64$       182,662,904.97$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2035 56.025 0.13 0.15 1.49 1.61 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.77 29.25 27.26 26.78 9688560 8860740 208,631,255.93$       187,442,256.15$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2036 56.815 0.13 0.15 1.49 1.61 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.77 29.25 28.05 27.57 9688560 8860740 214,677,886.23$       192,972,243.99$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2037 57.605 0.14 0.15 1.60 1.61 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.88 29.25 28.72 28.36 9688560 8860740 219,847,789.92$       198,502,231.82$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2038 58.395 0.14 0.16 1.60 1.72 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.88 29.35 29.51 29.04 9688560 8860740 225,894,420.22$       203,281,583.01$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2039 59.185 0.14 0.16 1.60 1.72 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 28.88 29.35 30.30 29.83 9688560 8860740 231,941,050.51$       208,811,570.84$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2040 59.975 0.15 0.16 1.72 1.72 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 29.00 29.35 30.98 30.62 9688560 8860740 237,110,954.21$       214,341,558.68$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2041 60.765 0.15 0.17 1.72 1.82 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 29.00 29.46 31.77 31.30 9688560 8860740 243,157,584.50$       219,120,909.87$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2042 61.555 0.15 0.17 1.72 1.82 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 29.00 29.46 32.56 32.09 9688560 8860740 249,204,214.80$       224,650,897.70$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2043 62.345 0.15 0.17 1.72 1.82 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 29.00 29.46 33.35 32.88 9688560 8860740 255,250,845.10$       230,180,885.53$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2044 63.135 0.16 0.17 1.83 1.82 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 29.11 29.46 34.02 33.67 9688560 8860740 260,420,748.79$       235,710,873.37$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2045 63.925 0.16 0.18 1.83 1.93 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 29.11 29.57 34.81 34.36 9688560 8860740 266,467,379.09$       240,490,224.56$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2046 64.715 0.16 0.18 1.83 1.93 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 1.42 0.64 1.21 29.11 29.57 35.60 35.15 9688560 8860740 (160,485,990.62)$      246,020,212.39$        15011 12887 13322 10144 1689 2743 4,432     
2047 65.505 0.18 1.93 1 24.01 1.42 1.21 29.57 35.94 8860740 (65,849,799.78)$         12887 10144 2743 2,743     
Operating Life Total 300345360 283543680 402,332,267$             (564,465,752)$            465345 412384 412994 324613 52351 87771 140122
NPVs @ 9%
 @ 200/1600 and 350/1480) (-10% parasite load) (90% capture rate)
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2. Installed units: H =400MW/ Y=350MW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forecast Electricity prices Fuel Costs $/GJ Fuel Costs $/MWh VOM $/MWh FOM $/MWh VOM (CCS) $/MWhFOM (CCS) $/MWhAverage costs $/MWh Margins $/MWh Electricity Sent-Out MWh NPAT (Tax @ 21%) Emissions (kt) (no CCS) Emissions (kt) Emissions Saved (kt)
FY E(Pw) H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y Total
2016 41.015 0.09 0.1 1.03 1.07 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 29.70 28.71 11.31 12.30 9565920 8860740 (2,328,502,570.86)$  (2,026,127,247.27)$   15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2017 41.805 0.09 0.1 1.03 1.07 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 29.70 28.71 12.10 13.09 9565920 8860740 91,470,854.45$          91,655,658.37$          15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2018 42.595 0.09 0.11 1.03 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 29.70 28.82 12.89 13.78 9565920 8860740 97,440,945.12$          96,435,009.56$          15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2019 43.385 0.1 0.11 1.15 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 29.82 28.82 13.57 14.57 9565920 8860740 102,545,407.00$       101,964,997.40$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2020 44.175 0.1 0.11 1.15 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 29.82 28.82 14.36 15.36 9565920 8860740 108,515,497.67$       107,494,985.23$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2021 44.965 0.1 0.11 1.15 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 29.82 28.82 15.15 16.15 9565920 8860740 114,485,588.34$       113,024,973.06$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2022 45.755 0.1 0.11 1.15 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 29.82 28.82 15.94 16.94 9565920 8860740 120,455,679.01$       118,554,960.90$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2023 46.545 0.1 0.12 1.15 1.29 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 29.82 28.93 16.73 17.62 9565920 8860740 126,425,769.69$       123,334,312.09$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2024 47.335 0.11 0.12 1.26 1.29 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 29.93 28.93 17.40 18.41 9565920 8860740 131,530,231.56$       128,864,299.92$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2025 48.125 0.11 0.12 1.26 1.29 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 29.93 28.93 18.19 19.20 9565920 8860740 137,500,322.23$       134,394,287.75$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2026 48.915 0.11 0.12 1.26 1.29 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 29.93 28.93 18.98 19.99 9565920 8860740 143,470,412.90$       139,924,275.59$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2027 49.705 0.11 0.13 1.26 1.39 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 29.93 29.03 19.77 20.67 9565920 8860740 149,440,503.58$       144,703,626.78$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2028 50.495 0.12 0.13 1.37 1.39 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.04 29.03 20.45 21.46 9565920 8860740 154,544,965.45$       150,233,614.61$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2029 51.285 0.12 0.13 1.37 1.39 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.04 29.03 21.24 22.25 9565920 8860740 160,515,056.12$       155,763,602.44$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2030 52.075 0.12 0.13 1.37 1.39 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.04 29.03 22.03 23.04 9565920 8860740 166,485,146.79$       161,293,590.28$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2031 52.865 0.12 0.14 1.37 1.50 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.04 29.14 22.82 23.72 9565920 8860740 172,455,237.47$       166,072,941.46$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2032 53.655 0.12 0.14 1.37 1.50 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.04 29.14 23.61 24.51 9565920 8860740 178,425,328.14$       171,602,929.30$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2033 54.445 0.13 0.14 1.49 1.50 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.16 29.14 24.29 25.30 9565920 8860740 183,529,790.01$       177,132,917.13$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2034 55.235 0.13 0.14 1.49 1.50 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.16 29.14 25.08 26.09 9565920 8860740 189,499,880.69$       182,662,904.97$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2035 56.025 0.13 0.15 1.49 1.61 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.16 29.25 25.87 26.78 9565920 8860740 195,469,971.36$       187,442,256.15$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2036 56.815 0.13 0.15 1.49 1.61 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.16 29.25 26.66 27.57 9565920 8860740 201,440,062.03$       192,972,243.99$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2037 57.605 0.14 0.15 1.60 1.61 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.27 29.25 27.33 28.36 9565920 8860740 206,544,523.90$       198,502,231.82$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2038 58.395 0.14 0.16 1.60 1.72 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.27 29.35 28.12 29.04 9565920 8860740 212,514,614.58$       203,281,583.01$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2039 59.185 0.14 0.16 1.60 1.72 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.27 29.35 28.91 29.83 9565920 8860740 218,484,705.25$       208,811,570.84$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2040 59.975 0.15 0.16 1.72 1.72 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.39 29.35 29.59 30.62 9565920 8860740 223,589,167.12$       214,341,558.68$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2041 60.765 0.15 0.17 1.72 1.82 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.39 29.46 30.38 31.30 9565920 8860740 229,559,257.80$       219,120,909.87$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2042 61.555 0.15 0.17 1.72 1.82 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.39 29.46 31.17 32.09 9565920 8860740 235,529,348.47$       224,650,897.70$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2043 62.345 0.15 0.17 1.72 1.82 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.39 29.46 31.96 32.88 9565920 8860740 241,499,439.14$       230,180,885.53$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2044 63.135 0.16 0.17 1.83 1.82 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.50 29.46 32.63 33.67 9565920 8860740 246,603,901.01$       235,710,873.37$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2045 63.925 0.16 0.18 1.83 1.93 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.50 29.57 33.42 34.36 9565920 8860740 252,573,991.69$       240,490,224.56$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2046 64.715 0.16 0.18 1.83 1.93 1 1 24.89 24.01 1.50 1.42 1.28 1.21 30.50 29.57 34.21 35.15 9565920 8860740 (174,455,917.64)$      246,020,212.39$        15011 12887 11634 10144 3378 2743 6,120     
2047 65.505 0.18 1.93 1 24.01 1.42 1.21 29.57 35.94 8860740 (65,849,799.78)$         12887 10144 2743 2,743     
Operating Life Total 296543520 283543680 (833,307,733)$            (564,465,752)$            465345 412384 360643 324613 104703 87771 192474
NPVs @ 9%
(-10% parasite load) @ 400/1600 and 350/1480) (90% capture rate)
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3. Installed units: H =600MW/ Y=700MW 
 @ 600/1600 and 700/1480)
Forecast Electricity prices Fuel Costs $/GJ Fuel Costs $/MWh VOM $/MWh FOM $/MWh VOM (CCS) $/MWhFOM (CCS) $/MWhAverage costs $/MWh Margins $/MWh Electricity Sent-Out MWh Profit Emissions (kt) (no CCS) Emissions (kt) Emissions Saved (kt)
FY E(Pw) H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y H Y Total
2016 41.015 0.09 0.1 1.03 1.07 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.59 31.35 11.42 9.67 9443280 8646120 (3,535,795,620.92)$  (4,158,455,889.52)$   15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2017 41.805 0.09 0.1 1.03 1.07 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.59 31.35 12.21 10.46 9443280 8646120 91,102,932.09$          71,445,989.60$          15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2018 42.595 0.09 0.11 1.03 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.59 31.45 13.00 11.14 9443280 8646120 96,996,483.14$          76,109,577.96$          15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2019 43.385 0.1 0.11 1.15 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.71 31.45 13.68 11.93 9443280 8646120 102,035,503.19$       81,505,621.45$          15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2020 44.175 0.1 0.11 1.15 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.71 31.45 14.47 12.72 9443280 8646120 107,929,054.24$       86,901,664.94$          15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2021 44.965 0.1 0.11 1.15 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.71 31.45 15.26 13.51 9443280 8646120 113,822,605.29$       92,297,708.43$          15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2022 45.755 0.1 0.11 1.15 1.18 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.71 31.45 16.05 14.30 9443280 8646120 119,716,156.34$       97,693,751.92$          15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2023 46.545 0.1 0.12 1.15 1.29 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.71 31.56 16.84 14.99 9443280 8646120 125,609,707.38$       102,357,340.28$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2024 47.335 0.11 0.12 1.26 1.29 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.82 31.56 17.51 15.78 9443280 8646120 130,648,727.44$       107,753,383.77$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2025 48.125 0.11 0.12 1.26 1.29 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.82 31.56 18.30 16.57 9443280 8646120 136,542,278.49$       113,149,427.26$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2026 48.915 0.11 0.12 1.26 1.29 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.82 31.56 19.09 17.36 9443280 8646120 142,435,829.54$       118,545,470.76$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2027 49.705 0.11 0.13 1.26 1.39 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.82 31.67 19.88 18.04 9443280 8646120 148,329,380.58$       123,209,059.11$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2028 50.495 0.12 0.13 1.37 1.39 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.94 31.67 20.56 18.83 9443280 8646120 153,368,400.64$       128,605,102.60$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2029 51.285 0.12 0.13 1.37 1.39 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.94 31.67 21.35 19.62 9443280 8646120 159,261,951.69$       134,001,146.10$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2030 52.075 0.12 0.13 1.37 1.39 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.94 31.67 22.14 20.41 9443280 8646120 165,155,502.74$       139,397,189.59$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2031 52.865 0.12 0.14 1.37 1.50 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.94 31.77 22.93 21.09 9443280 8646120 171,049,053.78$       144,060,777.94$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2032 53.655 0.12 0.14 1.37 1.50 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 29.94 31.77 23.72 21.88 9443280 8646120 176,942,604.83$       149,456,821.44$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2033 54.445 0.13 0.14 1.49 1.50 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.05 31.77 24.39 22.67 9443280 8646120 181,981,624.89$       154,852,864.93$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2034 55.235 0.13 0.14 1.49 1.50 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.05 31.77 25.18 23.46 9443280 8646120 187,875,175.94$       160,248,908.42$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2035 56.025 0.13 0.15 1.49 1.61 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.05 31.88 25.97 24.14 9443280 8646120 193,768,726.98$       164,912,496.78$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2036 56.815 0.13 0.15 1.49 1.61 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.05 31.88 26.76 24.93 9443280 8646120 199,662,278.03$       170,308,540.27$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2037 57.605 0.14 0.15 1.60 1.61 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.17 31.88 27.44 25.72 9443280 8646120 204,701,298.09$       175,704,583.76$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2038 58.395 0.14 0.16 1.60 1.72 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.17 31.99 28.23 26.41 9443280 8646120 210,594,849.14$       180,368,172.12$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2039 59.185 0.14 0.16 1.60 1.72 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.17 31.99 29.02 27.20 9443280 8646120 216,488,400.18$       185,764,215.61$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2040 59.975 0.15 0.16 1.72 1.72 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.28 31.99 29.69 27.99 9443280 8646120 221,527,420.24$       191,160,259.10$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2041 60.765 0.15 0.17 1.72 1.82 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.28 32.10 30.48 28.67 9443280 8646120 227,420,971.29$       195,823,847.46$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2042 61.555 0.15 0.17 1.72 1.82 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.28 32.10 31.27 29.46 9443280 8646120 233,314,522.34$       201,219,890.95$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2043 62.345 0.15 0.17 1.72 1.82 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.28 32.10 32.06 30.25 9443280 8646120 239,208,073.38$       206,615,934.44$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2044 63.135 0.16 0.17 1.83 1.82 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.39 32.10 32.74 31.04 9443280 8646120 244,247,093.44$       212,011,977.93$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2045 63.925 0.16 0.18 1.83 1.93 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.39 32.20 33.53 31.72 9443280 8646120 250,140,644.49$       216,675,566.29$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2046 64.715 0.16 0.18 1.83 1.93 1 1 24.89 24.01 0.75 2.84 1.93 2.43 30.39 32.20 34.32 32.51 9443280 8646120 (176,965,804.46)$      222,071,609.78$        15011 12887 9945 7401 5066 5486 10,552   
2047 65.505 0.18 1.93 1 24.01 2.84 2.43 32.20 33.30 8646120 (89,932,346.73)$         12887 7401 5486 5,486     
Operating Life Total 292741680 276675840 (1,950,418,808)$        (2,723,269,925)$         465345 412384 308291 236842 157054 175542 332596
(-10% parasite load) (90% capture rate)
NPVs @ 9%
